
Routes to tour in Germany

Wertheim
Bensheim
Reichelsheim
Miltenberg
Michelstadt
Amorbach
Worms

The Nibelungen Route







German roads will get you there – to the Odenwald woods, for instance, where events in the Nibelungen saga, the mediaeval German heroic epic, are said to have taken place. Sagas may have little basis in reality, but these woods about 30 miles south of Frankfurt could well have witnessed gaiety and tragedy in days gone by. In Worms, on the left bank of the Rhine, people lived 5,000 years ago. From the 5th century AD the kings of Burgundy held court there, going hunting in the Odenwald.


With a little imagination you can feel yourself taken back into the past and its tales and exploits. Drive from Wertheim on the Main via Miltenberg and Amorbach to Michelstadt, with its 15th century half-timbered *Rathaus*. Cross the Rhine after Bensheim and take a look at the 11th to 12th century Romanesque basilica in Worms.

Visit Germany and let the Nibelungen Route be your guide.



1 The Hagen Monument in Worms
2 Miltenberg
3 Odenwald
4 Michelstadt
5 Wertheim





The German Tribune

Hamburg, 13 November 1988
Twenty-seventh year - No. 1347 - By air

A WEEKLY REVIEW OF THE GERMAN PRESS

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DEPOSE A BRX X

Rising hopes of change in a milder Europe

DER TAGESSPIEGEL

Western fears that Chancellor Kohl and his men might be led astray by Soviet sirens in Moscow seem slowly to have been assuaged.

Yet they demonstrate how deep-seated fears still are in a number of Western European countries that the Federal Republic might be tempted by all-German advances to set foot on the slippery terrain of neutralisation.

The note the Soviet leader sounded on the German Question in particular was far too coarse and blustery to give rise to any illusions on Bonn's part.

Self-appointed custodians of German foreign policy can fairly be reminded that the Germans, whose country is divided by the East-West border, have a special interest in detente in Europe.

They are equally interested in being on good terms with all neighbouring countries and in the success of Mr Gorbachov's reform policy, the repercussions of which are already making themselves felt in changes for the better in the European East Bloc.

Mr Whitehead, the assistant US Secretary of State, returned from a fact-finding tour of six Eastern European countries greatly impressed by this trend.

If Germany were to go it alone as feared, it could easily be prevented from doing so by the intensification of European institutions, which is still being delayed by certain European Community member-countries with outmoded *19th-century ideas on sovereignty*.

Mr Gorbachov has been quicker to sense the lie of the land and to develop a dynamism of his own, especially as the United States will be largely immobilised until President Reagan hands over to his successor in the White House.

The *US-Soviet INF* Treaty scrapping medium-range missiles has established the framework for a change in political atmosphere, and seeds of hope are beginning to grow in Europe in this milder climate.

Sad to say, the proposed Start Treaty halving strategic arsenals, or intercontinental missiles, was not finalised in time for the US Presidential elections.

The Soviet Union, which had long balked at on-the-spot inspections, has *lately demonstrated surprising flexibility* on this issue, but the remaining problems connected with assessing different weapon systems proved too difficult for treaty terms to be swiftly agreed.

During the election campaign President Reagan said a Start Treaty should be possible "within the next few years."

The outlook for the Strategic Defence Initiative, of which the Soviet Union took a dim view, has taken a turn for the worse

Level-headed expert analysis seems to have shown that the cost would be out of all proportion to the benefit and that any *such system (on which work continues)* could at best provide protection from attacks by minor nuclear powers.

The possibility of such attacks being launched can no longer be dismissed, especially when the keen interest shown by terrorist-oriented Third World heads of state to come by the Bomb is compared with their moral inferiority.

Against this background the talks on an international ban on chemical weapons *have gained in urgency*.

Since the Iraqis breached international law and used chemical weapons, probably *aided and abetted by German firms*, against Iranian troops and Kurdish women and children, their dreadful success has evidently decided other dubious regimes to start manufacturing chemical weapons.

They are fairly easy to manufacture, using chemicals that form the basis of pesticides. It is up to Washington and Moscow to set aside their differences on this point and put paid to the proliferation of chemical weapons.

Soviet disarmament proposals are currently concentrated on Western Europe. Mr Gorbachov, who advocates a world free from nuclear weapons, pays due consideration to the West's problems.

Given the East Bloc's superiority in conventional arms the defence of Western Europe — or even a credible deterrent — is still inconceivable without a limited stockpile of nuclear weapons.

Moscow has even met Europe halfway by *proposing* an asymmetrical reduction in conventional forces, bearing in mind the current imbalance in Europe.

That sounds tempting and could help to solve Nato's problems if only the Soviet Union were genuinely willing to take the existing balance of power into account.

It has yet to do so, as 15 years of MBFR troop-cut talks in Vienna have shown, talks that have become hopelessly entangled in the data debate.

Mr Gorbachov would like to replace the MBFR talks by a new and enlarged conference. The Warsaw Pact, meeting in Budapest, has called for an all-European summit conference to be held, including the United States and Canada.

This *conference*, as *emphatically proposed*, would discuss a reduction in both troop strengths and conventional armament in Europe. In order to reduce the risk of armed hostilities in Europe the activities of all armed forces between the Atlantic and the Urals are to be registered and procedures drawn up for contacts and consultations on the basis of equality.

If this conference is to amount to more than a mere stage on which *noncommittal disarmament poetry* readings are to be held, careful preparations and preliminary clarification by discreet epert talks *would seem indispensable.*

The specification of confidence-building measures to prevent a surprise attack in Europe has made encouraging headway at the CSCE review conference and ought to be left to the Helsinki process until such time as truly dramatic progress seems likely to require formal approval.

The rerun of the *Congress of Vienna* that Mr Gorbachov seems to envisage as a means of ensuring peace in Europe *would call for more thorough* preparations than the 1815 Congress, which can hardly be said to have gone down in history for its hard work.

Above all, impressive East Bloc plans must not hamper modernisation of the remaining short-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe. It must neither be accelerated nor delayed; *merely* undertaken when the need arises.

The scrapping of medium-range missiles *in Europe was not, when all is said* and done, the result of a unilateral decision by Nato to dispense with missile modernisation.

(Der Tagesspiegel, Berlin, 30 October 1988)

IN THIS ISSUE

The next edition of THE GERMAN TRIBUNE will appear on 27 November



Bonn Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (left) takes time off with German language students at the opening of the Goethe Institute in Beijing.

Genscher signs deal in China





Germany and China have formalised an arrangement to meet regularly. An agreement between the Bonn Foreign Office and the Beijing Ministry of External Affairs has been signed in Bonn by Foreign Ministers Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Qian Qichen.

The agreement lends a new quality to *bilateral relations*. But it should not be overrated; in its immediate effect it does no more than spell out what is already happening.

It reflects the intensified exchange of views between Bonn and Beijing, a dialogue that has been encouraged by the steady improvement in relations between Washington and Beijing.


Page 7: Siemens signs agreement to make digital telephone exchanges in China.

That is why the political and economic agreements reached during Herr Genscher's visit to China tallied with the policy pursued by the United States which, like Bonn and the European Community, has welcomed the process of rapprochement between Beijing and Moscow.

It must be recalled that the United States made the resumption of talks Mr Gorbachov's Soviet Union subject to the dialogue not being limited to disarmament.

It was to include regional conflicts, such as Cambodia, which keenly interests China. *In the wake of the Moscow*

Continued on page 2



■ WORLD AFFAIRS

Room for a little Czech prestavba but hardly for demokratisazia

DIE ZEIT

A small handbill calling for a peaceful demonstration in the centre of Prague on Independence Day, 28 October, was posted on walls all over the the Czech capital.

But only for a day. That night the stickers were all removed by the authorities.

The stickers featured the Bohemian lion, the Czech heraldic animal, in chains but with one link broken, and, in large letters, the word "Now!"

The demonstration was called for by the Czech Independence Initiative, a group of five Opposition movements, and although the stickers were only in place for a few hours thousands of people were aware of the time and place and turned up for the demonstration.

The five groups were the Charta '77 civil rights campaigners and the Children of Bohemia, young people who organised the 21 August demonstration on which over 10,000 people recalled Dubcek's "socialism with a human face."

Then there were the Democratic Initiative, which supports the ideals proclaimed by the founding father of free Czechoslovakia, President Masaryk, in 1918, an Independent Pacifist Association and the Club of Friends of the United States.

They planned to recall Czech independence with pride and longing, and to look critically at conditions in Czechoslovakia today, 20 years after the Prague Spring.

But the Opposition's application to hold a demonstration was rejected and Interior Minister Kyncl banned all assemblies in the centre of Prague.

All except one, an official demonstration in which the Communist Party had arranged for *200,000 people from* Prague and environs to take part on the eve of Independence *Day*.

To forestall the Opposition the Party had declared 28 October, *the anniversary* of Czech independence 70 years ago, a *national holiday. (It had abolished it in the early 1950s as a "bourgeois anniversary.")*

A wreath was laid for the first time at *the grave of President Masaryk, the first* democratic head of state, who had previously been *accused of betraying progress*. The new Party leader, Milos Jakes, who took over from ageing orthodox comrade-in-arms Gustav Husak last December, had the square where the demonstration was held adorned with the slogan *prestavba*, the *Czech word for* perestroika.

But his prestavba has nothing in common with the radical reconstruction advocated by Mr Gorbachov.

Czech-style perestroika consists of limited economic reforms, greater efficiency in agriculture and industry and marginally more incentives and easements for private enterprise, a small and narrowly defined sector.

What it certainly isn't intended to include is a dialogue with the Opposition. There would be no such dialogue as long as he led the Czech Communist Party, Mr Jakes said.

He, incidentally, was in charge of "normalisation," as the post-Prague Spring purge was known, in his capacity as chairman of the Party's central revision and control commission.

The banners proclaiming prestavba as the "new road for society" on revolutionary red were still in place the next day when several thousand demonstrators, mostly young people, met at the statue of St Wenceslaus, the Czechs' patron saint.

They had succeeded in slipping through the police cordon. Others — no-one knows how many — failed to do so.

The demonstrators sang the national anthem and white-helmeted police units with truncheons raised goose-stepped into position to the stirring melody, advancing toward the assembled demonstrators in slow motion, as it were.

It was a depressing sight, a ballet performed by goose-stepping robots.

The demonstrators chanted "Freedom! Freedom!" Hands were clapped to accompany calls for Masaryk and Dubcek.

They were followed by chants of "Gestapo! Gestapo!" as the police moved in, surely the worst term of abuse that could possibly be levelled at the police in a country that suffered so appallingly at the hands of the Nazis.

The police turned water cannons and guard dogs on the demonstrators. Official sources said 87 demonstrators were arrested, 120 well-known critics of the regime having been taken into custody the day before.

Nearly all have since been released, but they face heavy sentences if convicted on charges of "undermining the Republic."

This is the old policy of ongoing "normalisation" pursued by new, old men in Dr Husak's wake.

Despite the most far-reaching leadership *reshuffle in 20 years (nearly* the entire government was replaced a few *weeks ago) there are no signs of a* change of course in domestic policy.

There may be a little prestavba, but no demokratisazia, let alone glasnost.

For that would mean the dogmatic Czech Communists who called on Mr Brezhnev's Soviet Union for assistance now having to call on Mr Gorbachov to back political reforms.

They would be obliged to acknowledge and accept the intellectual affinity of Alexander Dubcek and Mikhail Gorbachov — and then to step down.

Joachim Jauer

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 4 November 1988)

Continued from page 1

summit which testified to a pragmatic and constructive approach by the Kremlin, agreements between Peking and Moscow are now feasible.

In starting to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan the Soviet Union has fulfilled one of the three conditions Peking laid down.

If Moscow thinned out its troops on the Sino-Soviet border and persuaded Vietnam to withdraw its forces entirely from Cambodia, there would be no obstacle to better relations between the two.

The West has every reason to take a positive view of this. Peace in South-East Asia can only consolidate economic development and help to ensure peace in general.

Greater stability in South-East Asia will lay a better groundwork for closer economic ties, in which the West wants.

Herr Genscher spoke on the West's behalf in the Chinese capital. He succeeded in his mission.

Bodo Schulte

(Nordwest Zeitung, Oldenburg, 1 November 1988)

A touch of sophistry in Polish Premier's Thatcher argument

Hannoversche Allgemeine

Mieczyslaw Rakowski, the new Polish *Prime Minister, calls himself a* pupil of the British Prime Minister, *Margaret Thatcher.*

He says she has shown that a govern*ment must prevail over militant trade* unions in order to enable healthy econ*omic forces to emerge*

The Polish President, General Jaruzelski, says Rakowski *isn't being ironic*; he is serious.

While praising the "Iron Lady" General Jaruzelski said he was surprised at *foreign politicians* demanding the very rights for Polish trade unions which they object to in their own countries.

He also voiced doubts that Britain's Trades Union Congress (TUC) was independent of the Labour Party.

These comments by the two leading men in Warsaw are characteristic of the Polish regime and of many latter-day communist leaders. They are an unpleasant combination of ignorance, cynicism and presumption.

Trade unions' rights are no more called into question in Britain than in other democratically governed countries.

Mr Rakowski in particular, who frequently visits the West and has talked with Social Democrats for years, must know that the TUC is not dependent on the Labour Party. If anything, it is the other way round.

In absurdly comparing Britain and Poland Messrs Jaruzelski and Rakowski disregard the fact that in Britain there is a free play of political forces on the basis of more or less fair rules, whereas in Poland a small, uncontrolled minority is intent on imposing its will on the majority.

What makes the comments by General Jaruzelski and Mr Rakowski so scandalous is not, however, that the Polish leaders choose to ignore or to disregard essential facts.

It is that they, who still refer to Karl Marx in justification of their power, show not the slightest sign of social sensitivity.

Mrs Thatcher's ideas are not wholly endorsed in democratic debate, and not merely among Social Democrats. Many feel that her policies give the weaker sections of society a raw deal.

This viewpoint is the basis of the Labour Party's manifesto and ought, in a democracy, to be a matter of course.

Yet for the Polish Communist leaders it is a world apart. They are enthusiastic advocates of a style of capitalism not even Mrs Thatcher wants anything to do with.

Astute critics have long exposed communist regimes as being based on an oppressive system in which social justice is the least consideration.

Yet democrats are still misled into believing that communists, although they may not attach great importance to freedom, are very keen on equality.

Mr Gorbachov's glasnost has made it increasingly clear that conditions in the communist countries have more in common with the Mafia than with social revolutionary ideas.

Members of the present-day communist elite may no longer be Mafiosi, but they are still a far cry from anything that might be termed political culture.

They blindly imitate what they take to be Western, preferably American, efficiency while feeling in no way bound by solidarity with their fellow-citizens.

A move that typifies this approach is the blunt way in which the closure of the Lenin shipyard in Gdansk was ordered.

The government said its closure was necessary because it was uneconomic and blandly referred to what it claimed were similar measures in the West.

Not a mention was made of the fact that none of the leading Polish companies, all of which are run from Warsaw, can be said to run at a profit. The *Gdansk shipyard has been plunged* into the red by politicians, and it is now to be *shut down on political grounds* — as a stronghold of the Opposition.

The 11,000 people who work at the shipyard are merely figures on a chessboard. Officially they are the owners of the shipyard where they work, but noone in Warsaw saw fit to consult them on the subject.

Even the officially recognised trade union, whose leader is a member of the politbureau, felt obliged to protest, arguably on grounds of vestigial self-respect.

Messrs Jaruzelski and Rakowski have made it clear in what atmosphere the round-table talks with the Opposition will be held, always assuming they take place.

The regime has no intention of relinquishing its monopoly of power and taking others seriously as partners in power.

Yet the representatives of majority opinion in Poland must seek to conduct a non-violent debate. They have no choice.

Claus Preller

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 4 November 1988)

The German Tribune

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■ HOME AFFAIRS

Running a democracy and avoiding the pitfalls

How does democracy work? Who does *the leading? Is leadership in the accepted sense possible?* These were some of the topics discussed at a meeting of the German Society for Parliamentary Affairs and Passau University. Speakers compared the styles of different Bonn chancellors, looked at who they relied on; examined which people had what power; assessed the power of the Bundestag, the machinery of government, the relationship of government to the media, the role of the judiciary and the influence of the European Community. Hans Helgert reports for the Munich daily, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*.

Who gives the lead in a democracy — and how? Is leadership indeed possible?

Democratic systems of government are organised in widely differing ways. In Washington, the system is extremely complex and involved.

The power of the US President can be extremely wide-ranging. In Britain, the system is more neatly arranged.

Britain is centrally governed from Whitehall. The first-past-the-post electoral principle almost always ensures clear majorities and the Prime Minister is in a strong position in Parliament.

The Prime Minister can, from 10 Downing Street, advise the Queen to dissolve Parliament — a powerful prerogative.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, contemporary historians and political scientists have been hampered in making judgements partly because Cabinet minutes are not yet accessible and minutes of other crucial decision-making bodies have not been kept.

In the early days frequent reference was made to a *Kanzlerdemokratie*, or "Chancellorial democracy," usually pejoratively meant about Chancellor Adenauer's style of government.

Other descriptions of the German system of government, usually critical, have followed. It has been called a party-political democracy, a corporate state, a judicial state and a telecracy.

The German Society for Parliamentary Affairs and Passau University, which have five times jointly held symposia, hosted a discussion. Historians and political scientists outlined their views. So did experienced politicians past and present, particularly Bundestag Speaker Philipp Jenninger.

Much mention was, inevitably, made of Adenauer's *Kanzlerdemokratie*. Was it really dependent on the individual or the institution (the Chancellor's constitutional responsibility for laying down the guidelines of government policy)?

Konrad Adenauer was adept at imposing his will on the party, the parliamentary party and the various coalitions he headed.

His skill at keeping members of his Cabinet quiet (he sometimes did this by humiliation), at playing conflicting forces *off against each other, at resorting to intrigue* and at having no qualms about *how election campaigns were run* was mentioned by one speaker after another.

He made short shrift of his mistakes and made light of his defeats by means *of irony. He was an autocrat, a seigneur,* admired, envied, feared and hated.

Yet despite this skill at dividing and ruling was, he soon came up against limits to his personal influence on decisions reached by democratic institutions.

He left the day-to-day management of the Chancellor's Office to his outstanding state secretary, Hans Globke, whose absolute personal loyalty he could be sure of.

He left contacts with the parliamentary party to Heinrich Krone, who was in later years equally unswerving in his loyalty to the Chancellor.

Sometimes he consulted the occasional banker friend, but he had no personal advisers, no "kitchen Cabinet."

He visited the CDU head office once a year, for the Christmas party. Long term, that did not do him any good.

Handling the Cabinet grew more difficult. The party was less willing to be manhandled, especially after the crisis triggered by his sudden announcement, in 1959, that he planned to stand for head of state, followed by the decision not to.

He even had trouble handling the Bundesrat, or Upper House of the Bundestag, in which the *Länder*, or Federal states, were represented.

The Bundesrat referred his plan to set up what would have amounted to a TV network run by the Federal government to the constitutional court, which ruled it unconstitutional in 1961.

The President, Heinrich Lübke, regarded as an unspectacular person, made full use of his constitutional powers to express views of his own.

Christian Democratic leaders grew dissatisfied. It is not unrealistic to surmise *that Adenauer's personal, autocratic* style eventually led to other centres *of opinion and leadership in German* democracy laying claim to their and powers.

Adenauer foundered when the parliamentary *party realised he was not the* vote-winner he once had been. Political *parties can be ruthless.*

Ludwig Erhard, his successor, sought in contrast to rule by consent. He saw himself as a *Volkskanzler*, or People's Chancellor.

But he neglected the party, quickly lost authority and was forced by its leaders to resign.

The 1966-69 Grand Coalition led by CDU Chancellor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger and SPD Foreign Minister Willy Brandt got off to a flying start, partly due to new centres of coordination (such as the Kressbronn Circle, consisting of leading CDU/CSU and SPD politicians).

It was also due to the personal relationship between parliamentary party leaders Rainer Barzel, CDU/CSU, and Helmut Schmidt, SPD.

The term *Kanzlerdemokratie* was no longer mentioned.

Brandt, as Chancellor from 1969 to 1974, governed with a group of personal advisers. When he finally stopped giving the lead, the powerful (and worried) Herbert Wehner, leader of the SPD parliamentary party, turned against him.

Helmut Schmidt's style of government had most in common with Adenauer's.

And, like Adenauer, it was his style that eventually lost him the support of his own party and that of his coalition partner, the Free Democrats.

Kohl is more subtle. He has gathered political advisers well-versed on many issues and unquestionably loyal. He keeps both ministers and parliamentary parties on their toes by constantly setting deadlines.

He too has been criticised by his own party, the CDU, in the Bundestag for not providing a regular flow of information; and has come under fire from the Bundesrat.

The drastic decline in his (and his party's) popularity could be dangerous, but generally he has the party firmly under control.

All Chancellors try to use the Chancellor's Office and the Press Office, which both feed and filter information to the political leadership.

When both are headed by the right men, they help enormously and have saved many serious mistakes.

Ties with senior civil servants in other ministries are important. This was certainly true of Hans Globke under Adenauer and of Claus Schüler and *Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski under* Schmidt; it may also be true of Wolfgang *Schäuble under Kohl.*

At the Press and Information Office it *was true of Felix von Eckardt under* Adenauer and may also be true of the incumbent, Friedhelm Ost.

Observers agree that the Bundestag's political power is greater than it used to be, despite appearances.

That is partly due to the German peculiarity of closely-interlocking ties between the legislative and the executive.

Nearly one in five Bundestag members who belong to a coalition party is a minister or parliamentary state secretary.

For years the leaders of the parliamentary parties have also taken part in important Cabinet meetings. The division of powers principle is thus diluted.

The Bundestag takes its legislative and control functions very seriously, especially in committees and commissions of inquiry.

Some say the Bundestag at times oversteps the mark. The finance committee has on occasion laid claim to rights to which it is not entitled on some issues.

The number and extent of parliamentary questions has also increased so much that the control function of Question Time has tended to be devalued — such as when detailed queries are used to hamper the machinery of government and boost the questioner.

Questions aimed at being informed more promptly about developments and government plans similarly make one wonder where the limits to competence and the distribution of power lie.

As for the media, *Professor* Oberreuter, host to the Passau conference, frequently noted that television, unlike radio or the print media, has to abbreviate and personalise complex situations and events to an extreme degree.

Television, because it is visual, is bound to stress names in the headlines *at receptions, on tour, at conferences, in* glamorous surroundings and shaking *hands with the high and mighty.*

The emphasis is not on the backroom *in parliament. Politics as seen on TV is* inevitably superficial and fleeting.

That is a *far cry from the complex* reality, which calls for more and more *detailed knowledge, rational thought* and competence in arriving at decisions.

This is a contradiction which could rebound and transform politics into a stage performance, *an art of self-portrayal* and marketing.

The result could be a trend toward plebiscitary democracy over and above parliamentary institutions. President Reagan is a past master of the art; so was General de Gaulle. So, to some ext-

Continued on page 4

The man they call the lightning rod

Eduard Ackermann, Chancellor Kohl's aide, has been called "Germany's most expensive lightning conductor." The implication is that he bears the brunt of the Chancellor's ire.

Dr Ackermann, 60, has also been dubbed "the Chancellor's sweeper" (in the soccer sense of the term) and "Kohl's early warning system." He is all that and much more.

Helmut Kohl's closest adviser was 60 on 1 November and, to mark the occasion, a reception for about 300 people was held in the Palais Schaumburg, the former Chancellor's Office. Dr Ackermann is the epitome of a professional politician. He wrote articles for a political magazine back in 1953 when he was still a student at Bonn University. He was appointed spokesman for the CDU/CSU parliamentary party in Bonn in March 1958 by Heinrich Krone, then CDU/CSU leader in the Bundestag. In this capacity he interpreted Christian Democratic policy for 25 years under CDU leaders Heinrich von Brentano, Rainer Barzel, Karl Carstens and Helmut Kohl.

Tell me quietly . . . Chancellor Kohl (left) and aide Ackermann. (Photo: Poly-Press)

When Herr Kohl finally succeeded in regaining power in October 1982, "Ede" Ackermann was a self-evident choice to *take with him to the Chancellor's Office.*

He has since been in charge of communication and documentation at the Chancellor's Office, but has never lost contact with the Press, yet oddly enough never been at loggerheads with chief government spokesmen.

When reports from Bonn refer to an *aide of the Chancellor they usually* mean him. He is a popular and highly *respected contact for journalists by virtue* of his fund of political experience *and "proximity to power."*

He has always been a loyal interpreter *of government policies — and absolutely* honest and straightforward.

Yet *he shuns the limelight in Bonn*. The place he prefers is behind the scenes or in *the prompter's box.*

Detlef Rudel

(Frankfurter Neue Presse, 2 November 1988)

■ GERMAN SOVEREIGNTY

Looking for some clarity in a confusing controversy

The limits to sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Germany have come under stronger scrutiny since the plane crash at Ramstein US Air Force base; in connection with low-altitude flying by Allied air forces; and because of activities on German soil by an American anti-terrorist unit.

The Bonn government has repeatedly been called on to use its sovereign rights in dealings with the three Western powers or to renegotiate the relevant treaties and agreements so it can be master in its own house at long last.

Chancellor Kohl has consistently warned against any attempt to renegotiate, and he is not alone. So did his Social Democratic predecessor, Helmut Schmidt.

Just what *is* the situation? Berlin international lawyer Dieter Schröder recently outlined the position in an article for the Hamburg weekly *Die Zeit*. He summarised it as being "confusing."

The Federal Republic's legal status was laid down in the so-called German Treaty of 1952, which came into force on 5 May 1955.

Professor Schröder goes on to point out that the Western powers call this agreement the Bonn Treaty, by which they emphasise that it "does not affect rights with regard to Germany as a whole but merely the position of the Federal Republic."

Article 1 of the Bonn Treaty, minuted to note the end of the occupation status, specifies that the Federal Republic is to enjoy "the full power of a sovereign state over its domestic and external affairs."

Professor Schröder feels it would have been quite feasible to clearly and indisputably specify the legal status of full and unlimited sovereignty.

The reason this was not done was the limitation, mentioned in the treaty, that "in view of the international situation, which has hitherto prevented the reunification of Germany and the conclusion of a peace treaty," the three Western powers reserved "the rights and responsibilities previously exercised or held with regard to Berlin and to Germany as a whole."

Disputes arising from the application of the treaty are to be referred to a mediation tribunal consisting of three German and three Western Allied representatives, but fundamental issues and the stationing of troops in Germany are not subject to its arbitration.

The rights of forces "stationed in the Federal Republic" are to be laid down in a forces treaty. In 1963 this treaty was replaced by an annex to the Nato forces statutes.

It specifies, for instance, that German law must, in principle, be observed in respect of exercises in German air space — and agreement reached with the German authorities.

Professor Schröder feels that despite the strictly limited opportunities of revoking the treaty respect for the Federal Republic's sovereignty follows from this provision.

He then notes that the Bonn Treaty deals with the stationing of forces "in Germany," which in his view is an entirely "different quality" from troops stationed "in the Federal Republic." The treaty does not affect the Allies' rights to station troops "in Germany" because they are required to exercise Allied rights and responsibilities in Germany.

The Federal Republic expressly declared itself to approve of these stationing rights, details of which were laid down in a 1954 treaty which came into force 12 hours after the Bonn Treaty.

They were to apply until such time as a peace treaty or other, comparable agreement came into force and could thus not be revoked by the Federal Republic.

Unlike the Bonn Treaty, the 1954 treaty regulating the presence of Allied troops gives rise to doubts as to the Federal Republic's sovereignty, Professor Schröder says:

"The complicated construction involving geographically differentiated stationing rights serves the purpose of reconciling the legal status of the Federal Republic, in principle one of sovereignty, and the overriding authority enjoyed by the Allies since 1945 in respect of stationing troops in Germany."

The crux of the arrangement, he argues, was the statement "that the Bonn Treaty does not affect the Allies' original occupation rights gained in the Second World War."

These rights were independent of the 1954 treaty and were additionally underscored by the fact that even after the Federal Republic had been invested with the full rights of a sovereign state Allied forces remained stationed in the Federal Republic for 12 hours on the basis of the original right of occupation.

The 1954 treaty was only accepted by the Allies from the baseline of this status independent of the approval (or otherwise) of the Federal Republic.

Professor Schröder concludes from this fact that the 1954 treaty merely reaffirmed the existing legal situation, the validity of which did not depend on it in any way.

He describes it as a "document of cosmetic diplomacy" that did not broach the original rights of occupation held by the three Western Allies.

The Federal Republic was obliged to accept a "legal proviso" more far-reaching than was binding on any other Nato country.

"The Federal Republic does not enjoy any rights of a sovereign state," he concisely says, "in relation to troops stationed by the three Western powers with regard to Germany as a whole."

He then deals briefly with the situation in the GDR, where the USSR still calls its forces stationed there the "Soviet Armed Forces Group in Germany."

Professor Schröder sees this as demonstrating that the Soviet Union also abides by the "original stationing rights based on the right of occupation."

He goes on to note that on the basis of wartime and post-war agreements the Soviet Union is still entitled to station officers and men even in the territory of the present Federal Republic.

At present 60 members of the "Soviet Armed Forces Group in Germany" are stationed in the territory of the Federal Republic and not subject to German legal provisions of any kind.

This state of affairs alone, he argues, is sufficient to rule out any idea of the Federal Republic being an unrestrictedly sovereign state. It can only claim to be so in relation to countries that were never associated with the occupation of Germany.

Professor Schröder sees no possibility of a total revision of the legal position at present, although he well appreciates that now, 43 years after the war's end and at a time when most people are acquainted with what went on then merely from history books, questions are more frequently asked as to the basis on which foreign powers enjoy special rights in Germany.

The Federal Republic, he feels, must make the position clear. He points out

Bremer Nachrichten

that the three Western powers outlined further reasons of their own in 1954.

In the preamble to the 1954 treaty its aim is said to be to "ensure the defence of the free world."

If disarmament ever makes progress in Europe, he argues, the day might come when limitations to the sovereign rights of the Federal Republic could be tabled for negotiation.

Yet even then he can still envisage certain handicaps. While the 1954 treaty is to lapse once a peace treaty is signed with Germany the Bonn Treaty will merely come up for review in this contingency.

That implies a special relationship with the three Western powers and in respect of stationing rights in Germany for all time.

"This realisation," he writes, "can come as no surprise when one considers the fundamental agreements reached by the Four Powers at the end of the Second World War.

"The Four Powers expressed their determination to ensure that Germany would never again be in a position to disturb world peace (at Yalta in 1945). To this end they ruled that control over Germany was to be retained even after the end of occupation status as such.

"This can be read in the 1944 London Agreement on control provisions for Germany, an agreement that is still in force. It forms one of the bases of the special Allied rights and responsibilities in Germany."

Dietrich Ide

(Bremer Nachrichten, 22 October 1988)

Continued from page 3

ent, were Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt.

The other side of the coin is the increasing perfection of the judiciary, especially the constitutional, administrative and financial courts.

Last but not least, the European Community is making constant inroads on the national sovereignty of member-governments.

Can the Federal Republic still be led and governed, or is coordination the best that can be expected? Sceptics say the room for decision is steadily declining and compounding toward zero.

Others say that even in less favourable circumstances than exist today the government and parliament of the Federal Republic have assumed and exercised amazing decision-making powers.

Even complexities can come to be regarded as normal and be "led" or governed, always assuming there are enough people with the skill to do so.

Hans Heigert

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 22 October 1988)

■ PERSPECTIVE

50 years since the mob's Kristallnacht rampage

Fifty years ago the Nazi Press celebrated the *Reichskristallnacht* as a spontaneous expression of "popular anger" and collective retaliation against German Jews for a crime by a Jew.

It was the murder of Ernst Eduard vom Rath, an official at the German embassy in Paris, by Herschel Grünspan, a desperate young man threatened with deportation who had been forced to go underground.

Those domestic and foreign observers who did not believe the Nazi propaganda saw the *Kristallnacht* mayhem as organised vandalism and barbarity carried out under orders.

Mobs set fire to synagogues as the police and fire brigade stood by not to fight the fires but to stop them from spreading to "Aryan" property.

Jewish cemeteries, department stores, workshops and homes were wrecked and looted, nearly 100 Jews were killed, dozens driven to suicide and thousands arrested and sent to concentration camps.

"The streets were ruled by mobs," wrote the Berlin correspondent of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* on 10 November 1938, "that marched howling and bawling from one shop to the next destroying the entire stock and what was left after the shop windows and fittings had been broken and sacked the night before.

"Not one of over 1,000 Jewish shops in a city of four million people has *not* been transformed into a heap of ruins.

"In a radio shop you could see men wielding clubs smashing expensive ra-

DEUTSCHES ALLGEMEINES SONNTAGSBLATT

dio sets while other groups wielded pokers, crowbars and curtain rails."

This orgy of violence let loose before the eyes of international public opinion on 10 November partly continued on the next two days . It marked the peak, for the time being, of a trend that had progressively deprived German Jews of their civil rights and driven them into isolation.

It was the final, thunderous climax of a vulgar, resentment-laden, rowdy anti-Semitism deeply rooted in the various units of the Nazi Party.

It had previously found repeated expression in many excesses triggered and backed by local authorities. This local escape valve was now replaced by a more systematic approach increasingly controlled and centralised by the SS.

During the war this new approach was to culminate in the bureaucratic, industrialised annihilation policy of the "final solution" to the Jewish Question.

The November 1938 pogrom was seen by the victims as a milestone . The Reich representation of the Jews referred in its 1939 report to a "historic turning-point."

Those who had hoped times might improve and constitutional rights be restored now knew better. Jews no longer enjoyed a right of abode or even a place to live in Nazi Germany.

Those who could left. In 1938/39 there was an exodus of about 120,000 men, women and children, most of them penniless as a result of chicanery by the authorities. This figure was nearly equivalent to Jewish emigration in the previous five years.

Viewed in retrospect, the November 1938 excesses were less a turning-point than the consistent pursuit of a policy the direction of which had been clearly apparent since the end of 1937.

The pogrom was, as Israeli historian Avraham Barkai notes, "merely the signal to go ahead with and complete in a few weeks what had been inaugurated months beforehand."

After a phase of relative peace and quiet the Nazi regime had, in spring 1938, begun to step up perceptibly the pace of its anti-Jewish activities.

The Jews were bombarded with regulations aimed at finally ejecting them from their remaining positions in German society, at closing their last loopholes and at depriving them of the material basis of their very existence.

Jewish communities were stripped of their legal status as religious bodies, thus losing tax exemptions.

In April 1938 all Jews and their non-Jewish husbands or wives were required to register assets exceeding RM5,000.

Soon afterwards the few remaining Jewish firms were registered and identified as being under Jewish ownership.

Jewish doctors were no longer allowed to practise. Jewish lawyers were no longer allowed to practise law. Even Jewish commercial travellers and door-to-door salesmen were no longer allowed to stay in business.

Passports were withdrawn and replaced by documents sporting a "J" for Jew. From 1939 all German Jews were legally required to adopt the additional first name Israel or Sara.

Tn order to quicken legislation by pressure "from below" and to dispel misgivings of Ministry officials used to "legal" processes, expressions of what the Nazis called "popular anger" began in summer 1938.

Violent excesses occurred in individual towns and cities. There were pogrom-style riots. Anti-Semitic slogans were daubed on shop windows. Jews were arrested and sent to concentration camp.


In Munich and Nuremberg synagogues were wrecked and demolished. Josef Goebbels, Propaganda Minister and Gauleiter of Berlin, made firebrand anti-Semitic speeches.

As one of the most vociferous advocates of the most radical solution to the given problem he noted in his diary: "I am really letting rip against sentimentality of all kinds. Chicanery, not the law, is the order of the day. The Jews must be expelled from Berlin."

There was certainly no lack of evidence that the situation was coming to a head. The anti-Jewish campaign already exceeded "in thoroughness anything of its kind since the beginning of 1933," as the US ambassador noted in a report to Washington.

At the same the campaign to expropriate or, as the Nazis put it, "Aryanise" Jewish property was greatly intensified, being aided and abetted by Party branches, local authorities, chambers of commerce and industry, banks, profiteers and soldiers of fortune.

In January 1933 there were about 100,000 Jewish traders and companies. By the beginning of 1938 their number was down to about 40,000. Nearly two out of three had either gone out of business or changed hands. The later they were sold, the less they realised for the hapless owners. Some were intimidated, others openly threatened or blackmailed. Jewish company-owners were forced to sell for a song. The unscrupulous eagerness for plunder that was characteristic of the period is impressively documented in a letter written by a Munich businessman resigning as a court-appointed assessor. Even though he was, as he put it, a National Socialist, an SA man and an admirer of Adolf Hitler, he refused to serve any longer as a court-appointed assessor in Aryanisation cases. As an honest businessman of the old school he could no longer bear the barefaced way in which many "Aryan" businessmen tried to snap up Jewish shops and other businesses at give-away prices.



'The streets were ruled by howling mobs' . . . synagogue in Bamberg, Bavaria, is put to the torch. (Photo Ullstein)

"To my mind they behave like vultures," he wrote, "with eyes dripping and tongues drooling as they pounce on the Jewish carcass."

The proletarisation of German Jews was well under way long before the 1938 wave of Aryanisation.

At a time when German businessmen were complaining that labour was in short supply, Jewish unemployment was appallingly high.

The basis of the Jewish bourgeoisie was greatly reduced. "Many were impoverished," Barkai says, "and forced to live on public assistance."

Yet even though the Nazi regime turned the screw still further in 1938 and came much closer to its target of putting the Jews out of business, it cannot be said to have acted in accordance with either a uniform concept or a coordinated pattern.

Some of the measures were contradictory and uncoordinated. While the SS was keen to step up Jewish emigration, which appeared to be jeopardised by the pillage of Jewish property and assets, Hermann Göring, who was in charge of the four-year plan, as the war build-up was known, was mainly interested in financial and foreign exchange considerations.

The Nazis agreed that the Jews must be put out of business, but there were differences of opinion about how and how quickly.

Nazi activists, eager for action, felt the legislative machinery was far too slow. They lacked bureaucratic inhibitions and were not interested in cost-benefit considerations.

Hitler was also known to be dissatisfied with progress. But he preferred not to clearly say what should be done. That would not have been in line with his style of leadership.

The murder of Ernst vom Rath in the German embassy in Paris came as a welcome opportunity to mobilise the Party rank and file, to allow them to vent their spleen and to give rise to expectations that could then be met and given legal backing by official ordinances.

That was the motive for the *Reichskristallnacht*, which was staged and orchestrated by Goebbels, a radical anti-Semite, who may well have hoped to regain the Führer's favour.

Goebbels was in disfavour with Hitler on account of private affairs and wanted to boost his reputation by seizing the initiative.

Many ordinary Germans disapproved of the unbridled licence enjoyed by the Nazi thugs and saw no sense in their wanton destruction of property. There can be no doubt that anti-Semitic propaganda failed to trigger a general wave of support for the pogrom.

Yet there was no audible protest either. Readiness to help and gestures of sympathy with persecuted Jews were the exception, not the rule.

The majority preferred to exercise restraint on both their houses, the victims and the culprits, and after a brief interlude of shock it was back to business as usual.

The ordinances issued soon afterward, including the imposition of a RM1,000m "atonement" fine imposed on the Jews, seemed to meet with approval rather than rejection.

Even the Churches, as the last institutions that were more or less morally intact, had nothing to say on the subject.

It was as if "an invisible power," as Theophil Wurm, the Protestant bishop of Württemberg, recalled after the war, had forced people to keep their views to themselves.

Yet anti-Jewish prejudice was far from immaterial, as a letter Bishop Wurm himself wrote to the Justice Minister on 6 December 1938 clearly indicates.

In it he objected both to the form the pogrom had taken and to the inconvenience to which clergymen accused of being Jewish lackeys had been put.

Yet he went on to assure the Minister that: "I will not dispute for one moment the state's right to fight Jewry as a dangerous element."

For a man so committed to conservative Christian traditions of hostility toward the Jews it was bound to be difficult to delineate the rules of fair play and to lay down clear guidelines for Christians.

With laudable individual exceptions the Jews were given neither succour nor support, let alone active neighbourly love, by either Catholics or Protestants.

Jens Flemming

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, Hamburg, 6 November 1988)

■ THE TRADE UNIONS

Can they adjust to demands of the modern world?

The labour movement is in decline, so it is being said. The giant trade unions are said to be dinosaurs which will not survive the turn of the century.

The unions, so the argument goes, have remained labour organisations in the traditional sense and are failing to come to terms with the requirements of the times.

The fact is that white-collar workers have begun to overtake blue-collar workers *numerically* — but the trade unions are still numerically dominated by blue-collar workers.

There is no lack of suggestions on how to deal with the problem. Many of the suggestions are, however, inconsistent if well-intentioned.

The Premier of Baden-Württemberg, Lothar Späth, recommended at a meeting IG Metall, the engineering union, that the shop floor become the centre of union operations rather than union branches.

Peter Glotz, a Social Democrat who used to be the party's business manager, suggested *more of a political* approach. Both recommendations have *plausible arguments to support them.*

People's enthusiasm for trade unions *is rapidly declining.* There are changes which are causing this.

In these days of individuals, people want their own rights upheld. These are not always the same as someone else's rights. Interests cannot any longer always be negotiated on a collective basis.

Blanket wage agreements negotiated by trade unions satisfy only a minority. The better qualified people are, the more likely they are to insist on deciding for themselves.

Because Germany is a high-wage country which can only survive economically using technologically advanced production methods, the trend for better-trained workers is likely to intensify.

Individual demands are on the increase. This only increases the difficulties *of organisations which claim to* be working for the welfare of all.

The division of interests threatens to fragment organisations representing workers' interests. It is popularly believed that dinosaurs perished from the disparity between the size of their bodies and brains, because they were not able to adjust.

This image obviously does not apply to the trade unions. Some of them have woken up to the danger that an alert mind could be let down by a weak and unmanageable body.

Not only at the IG Metall conference *in Frankfurt was the impression given* that the engineering union's leadership was *not one but many steps ahead* of its membership. That is dangerous.

Technicians, scientists and managers, to whom the unions must make themselves look attractive, regard present recruitment campaigns with suspicion. Traditional shop-floor membership is grumbling as well.

The new line followed by the unions may offer them greater freedom, which they have misunderstood as a withdrawal of the protection they were used to.

Then many blue-collar workers find it hard to have a feeling of solidarity with a white-collar worker wearing a tie who comes from the factory's *administrative building.*

But a union leadership, which pursued *policies against the interests* of workers who pay contributions, would not long remain in office.

Trade union work is still a long and hard grind.

The trade unions have very little room for manoeuvre. Forced to relax the tight shackles of the past, there are dangers from too much freedom.

If wages policies should come apart at any point, then the trade union system is that much closer to disintegration — a development that employers and thinking conservatives do not want to see happen.

The newly-announced aim is, then, to create as much freedom for the individual as possible on the basis of collective agreements.

If the hoped for influx of technicians into the unions comes about, there will be an *increase in the number of specialist employees whom the unions can call upon within the co-determination* system, workers participating in management, for the unions cannot alone master their own future.

They are then determined that those who have profited from the benefits of wage agreements, without having any regard for the unions which represent their interests, should at least show some involvement for the collective interest.

If all sides find the necessary patience and flair, the trade unions certainly have a future.

Burkhard von Pappenheim

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 31 October 1988)

Next round of pay talks will be tougher

Workers always want higher wages. Germany's economy is in an excellent state. So why can't they have more money?

The wages agreements negotiated this year and last — involving both cash and shorter working hours — were not lavish. Most branches of industry have coped with them well.

Several unions agreed to long agreements — up to the beginning of the 1990s. Union negotiators at the time expected *only a mild economic upswing.*

And what has happened? Industry is *doing well. Pessimistic forecasts* were shown to be wrong. Exports are hitting record levels.

But unions who entered these long-term agreements — engineering workers, chemical workers, printing workers, public sector workers, are not getting anything extra.

It is almost amusing to recall the cries of horror from the employers' camp during wage negotiations in 1987, particularly in the engineering industry. It was said that irresponsible burdens were being placed on employers.

It was claimed that the engineering *union, IG Metall, was making excessive* demands, and employers could not af*ford the agreement* that was *being nego*tiated.

The bitter complaints made by employers influenced at least some sections of the public.

The trade unions must feel that they have been taken for a ride. Many companies have shown enormous profits. There is general satisfaction on the nation's executive boards.

All forecasts which predicted a declining economic growth rate have been wrong. The outlook is good.

But the unions with the long agreements are bound until the 1990s.

How would they stand if they should suddenly demand a revision? Would *they not reveal* that they *lacked* the necessary negotiating skills, after they themselves had *spoken of wage negotia*tion success as a consequence of tough bargaining?

How credible and reliable would they be regarded by employers in the future? Then could not employers, in a reverse situation, call for a revision of wage agreements downwards?

The unions do not want to get involved in renegotiation discussions.

When State Secretary Otto Schlecht from the Economic Affairs Ministry recently raised the subject, IG Metall, the engineering union, immediately declined to take it up. At the union's headquarters in Frankfurt the view was that the union did not want to be forced into such a debate.

The union's refusal also applied to *Schlecht's query whether a* "second helping" at factory level would not be possible — an unedifying idea for the trade unions which place great importance on comprehensive wage bargaining.

Just like IG Metall, IG Chemie, the chemicals industry union, has given assurances that the wage agreements negotiated will remain untouched. There is no question of thinking about requests for a revision of valid wage agreements.

This all sounds reasonable, unassuming and peaceable. But employers know *only too well that things will not remain* as they are. At the headquarters of the *various unions preparations are slowly* being made for the next round of wage *negotiations.*

Over the past few months prices have increased 1.3 per cent. The trade unions have negotiated for wage increases of between 1.4 and 2.5 per cent. In this there is only a small increase in purchasing power, and unions are also having to pay the price for having negotiated agreements with on average periods of validity that are too long.

Trade unions would be in a fix if prices suddenly rose sharply. There would be dissatisfaction in the factories — understandably.

It is not forgotten in trade union circles *that at the end of the 1960s* a mess was made of wage agreements. Employers' *representatives* were shocked by wild-cat strikes. They do not want to go through that again.

Therefore they point out that the present favourable economic statistics promise well for forthcoming wage negotiations.

There is not going to be a renegotiation. Instead there will be more next time round.

Workers are still hungry. Employers in the engineering industry will rapidly find that out when they take their places at the negotiating table in autumn of next year.

Hartmut Contenius

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 2 November 1988)

■ FINANCE

German bank loan intended to help the Russians fill their shop shelves

A German consortium headed by Deutsche Bank is to lend the Soviet Union three billion marks. The money will be used to buy German machinery and resources to improve the Russians' capacity to produce consumer goods. The deal was signed during Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow. This story was written by Werner Adam. It appeared in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.*

Soviet leader Gorbachov displayed *boldness and vision in his dealings* with the top executives from finance and industry who accompanied Kohl to Moscow.

Gorbachov's *praise for the Chancel*lor was dampened a little by his remarks, made from a sense of national pride, that the Soviet Union was not an economic hinterland for Germany and that it could go it alone if necessary.

But at the same time he impressed on Chancellor Kohl that trade, that cooperation in technology and science, would be from the start the backbone of Soviet-German relations.

All this is designed to help, 70 years after the October Revolution, the 300 *million people in the Soviet Union raise* their standard of living to a level corre*sponding to the natural wealth of their* country.

Gorbachov is not the first to observe the need for this: what makes him stand out is the sheer extent to which he is is prepared to relax ideological shackles.

Since Gorbachov is more serious about this than ever, supposed boldness and real vision boil down to a convergance of interests. Gorbachov must demonstrate to his fellow countrymen and women, ever sceptical, that perestroika can pay off for them.

Shop shelves full of goods are vital to achieve this. This opens up a much larg*er market than has been the case for* German industry in Russia.

It is, at least, clear where the priorities lie. They are not reflected in spectacular cooperation agreements for the construction of a high-temperature nuclear reactor or the skeleton agreement for cooperation in medical technicology which are satisfying to both sides.

Instead, they are reflected rather in the many accords and statements of in*tent which were signed during* Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow on the modernisation of the Soviet foodstuffs and consumer goods industries.

There is a demand here that can be seen everywhere in the shop queues and the disappointment on customers' faces when at last they have been able to fight their way to the counter.

Their patience is coming to an end. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership takes the view that the situation has not become precarious and that it does not *have to decide to introduce measures to* stimulate imports of foodstuffs and con*sumer merchandise, about which there* has been so much speculation in the Federal Republic.

Gorbachov and his advisers are likely to hold firm to the sound economic concept of importing machinery which will improve light industry's performance and make it more economic and flexible.

This at least is the declared aim of the Russian government. This aim is a distinct likelihood for a consortium of German banks has provided credits of approximately DM3bn, which Moscow *will probably allocate in full to the food*stuffs and consumer goods industries.

Important signals seem to be being put out here in view of the readiness of the bank consortium to make this credit available to the Soviet Union without state guarantees.

It is true that Russia has always been a good bet for western fincancial institutions.

But offers of funds totalling $15bn which are currently being made to Moscow by Italy, Britain, Japan and other industrialised nations, go way beyond the normal scope of credits.

Apart from the politicial confidence Gorbachov enjoys in the West, this development goes a long way towards confirming the view that the Soviet Union is more and more dependent on this method of financing.

The drop in oil prices has reduced foreign currency earnings too much for the Soviet leadership to maintain any longer its proverbial reserve against taking up credits.

In addition budget estimates show that Soviet foreign trade will be reduced by at least two per cent in the coming *year due to state finances that have been* out of balance for a long time.

Therefore Moscow is primarily interested in setting up investment for joint *ventures. It is true this kind of coopera*tion is the most complicated and is not too much favoured in the West, because the Russians take the view that these ventures should be export-oriented.

In his meeting with Chancellor Kohl Gorbachov showed an understanding of German reservations. His understanding was expressed not only in positive

Frankfurter Allgemeine

reactions to Kohl's suggestion that Russian experts and managers should be *trained over a long period in German* companies.

It was also shown in what could be a more important aspect: in the statement *of intent it was stated that an investment* protection agreement should be signed during Gorbachov's visit to Bonn — scheduled to take place probably in May next year.

But expectations should not be too high here. It is certainly going to take longer for the implementation of internal Soviet reforms such as decentralisation of the economy and the creation of a pricing system.

It is like carrying coals to Newcastle then to give advice of this sort to Federal Republic companies, experienced in trade with the Soviet Union.

They should be bold; they must be far-sighted — and patient, even in Moscow.

Werner Adam

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 29 October 1988)

Romania began the East Bloc's joint-venture affair with West

Joint ventures have become an accepted method of doing business for firms from different economic systems. Both management and risks are shared.

Germany is a leader in this field in the West. And Bavarian firms are the most active joint venturists in the Soviet Union.

East Germany *is* the only East Bloc country that has no joint ventures.

The *Polish* foreign chamber of trade reports that joint venture firms, with the *exception of in Hungary, are still small* scale.

Up to the end of 1987 there were 166 joint venture companies within the Comecon countries.

The joint venture fever began in 1977, in Romania, although there the number of joint ventures has dropped from nine to five.

There are 38 of joint companies in the Soviet Union, 15 in Bulgaria, 13 in *Poland* and two in Czechoslovakia.

The Polish chamber says there are 416 Comecon companies participating in firms in the West.

There are *99* from Russia, *86* from Hungary and 80 from Poland. Then comes *Bulgaria, East Germany, Cze*choslovakia and Romania.

Only 15 per cent of the Hungarian firms are involved in Western production companies. The others are mainly involved in trade and service companies.

Germany heads the list with 42 joint ventures (as at the end of 1987), followed by Austria with 37, Switzerland with 17 and Japan with 14.

Statistics show that 92 per cent of these companies produce capital and consumer goods. *Then* 32 are involved in exports, 15 in consultancy, 14 in *trade, 11 in technical services*, eight in the building industry and four in agricultural *companies.*

According to the Polish organisation the Comecon *countries* are primarily interested in joint ventures for reasons of licences and modern technology, sources of capital, improvements to production quality and efficiency, more effective management, to throttle back imports, save foreign currency, the creation of jobs and exports.

In Poland 15 to 25 per cent of profits made by Western participants in joint ventures have to be deposited with the Polish central bank.

In Czechoslovakia this is arranged individually. This barrier does not exist in other Comecon countries, although the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Poland demand that their nationals *run the companies.*

Joachim Görlich

(Welt am Sonntag, Hamburg, 30 October 1988)

Siemens signs a deal to make telephone exchanges in China

Siemens has signed a joint-venture deal to produce digital telephone exchanges in China. It has signed a similar deal with a Chinese micro-electronics firm.

The aerospace group, Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB), has speeded up a project to make a Sino-German civil *aircraft, the MPC 75.*

The Siemens telephone deal was its *first in China. It will work with the Beij*ing Wire Communication Plant (BWCP) and supply 42 per cent of the first construction phase capital of 110 million marks.

Production should begin in 1989 and, in the first phase, 300,000 units should be produced.

The first part of an extensive cooperation contract for the transfer of know-how on advanced micro-electronics was signed with the Micro-Electronics Complex in Wuxi.

Siemens captured both agreements in the teeth of intense international competition. *Under their terms*, more than 100 Chinese workers will be *trained in Germany.*

Bonn Foreign Minister Hans-Die*trich Genscher, who was in China when* the deals were signed, saw the foundation stone for a Siemens technology



centre laid in Peking. The centre, when *completed, will train between 500 and* 600 Chinese technicians annually.

The MBB *agreement with the* China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC) provides for the establishment of a joint Sino-German company, MPC 75 GmbH, based in Hamburg.

This company (80 per cent of the equity held by MBB and the remainder by the Chinese partner) will be responsible for the planning, organisation, regulation, coordination and control of joint activities involving the planned 80-seat aircraft. MBB is committed to providing *specific* know-how for the project,

MBB and CATIC have been working on the project since 1985. The preliminary research has been under *way since the beginning of this year and will last* until 1990. The first plane is scheduled *to come off the production line in* 1994.

In another agreement MBB will work together with CATIC in the area of alternative energy. China is to be supplied with wind-energy converters valued at DM1.5m from the MBB wind energy programme. These will be supplied mainly from MBB's Monopteros research project.

Step by step, wind energy components such as rotary blades and propulsion systems will be manufactured on a co-production basis.

The MBB division Energy and Process Technology was established four years ago along with production groups for bio-technology, energy and environmental protection systems.

Research and development will be undertaken at plant in Ottobrunn near *Munich and Hoykenkamp near Bremen.*

dpa/VWD

(Saarbrücker Zeitung, 1 November 1988)

THE CONSUMER

Causing confusion among marketing strategists

Marketing and advertising executives are worried about German consumers. Unpredictability makes it hard to plan.

The German male eats junk food for lunch but eats at nouvelle cuisine restaurants in the evening.

He wears old jeans one day and a new, tailor-made suit the next.

He saves pfennigs by being careful with day-to-day shopping — and buying at bargain-basement discount stores — yet buys an expensive after-shave balm in the boutique next door.

He writes personal letters on recycled paper to save the tropical rain forest yet drives flat-out along the autobahn at 180kph (112mph) and thereby pollutes his own forests with exhaust gas.

The average female is no more predictable. Marketing and advertising people are not the only ones to worry.

Consumer association officials are equally unable to explain consumer behaviour. All that can be said for sure is that the German housewife is not what she was.

She used, let us say, to be plain Lieschen Müller, née Maier. In these days of emancipation she insists on double-barreled status. Nothing less than Elisabeth Müller-Maier will do.

She is both more and less demanding, disrespectful yet inconsistent, and arguably guided by the motto:

"I value my new unpretentiousness so highly that I am prepared to pay dearly for the privilege."

Gone are the days when consumers could be clearly differentiated in terms of social category, age and education.

The experts have come up with a new term that merely shows how confused they are. They now refer to the "multi-dimensional consumer."

The keynote of the new consumer is that he is less likely to make his choice in accordance with the traditional either-or pattern; he is just as likely to go for both options.

What has brought about this change in consumer outlook? What might its repercussions be on politics, society and the economy?

The Consumer Institute Foundation, Berlin, has held courses on consumer affairs for teachers, consultants, politicians and journalists for 10 years.

Bankrolled by the Senate of Berlin and by the Federal Economic Affairs Ministry, Bonn, it also devises educational and curricular aids for consumer studies.

To mark its tenth anniversary it took a closer look at the "new era in the development of private consumption."

Hans-Jürgen Anders of the GfK, a Nuremberg-based consumer research association, feels the term "new era" is justified in three respects.

Consumers have more money at their disposal than ever before. They are better educated than ever. They are also in the throes of a far-reaching change in values.

The critical outlook of the 1970s, a mentality characterised by the slogan of limits to growth, has paled in significance.

Even people who are critical of social conditions no longer have qualms about enjoying affluence to the full, arguably combining left-wing views and right-wing consumer habits.

Not for nothing do they do so. The average consumer has found out for himself that there *are* no limits to growth.

In the past 25 years the disposable income of German households has quadrupled in real terms.

In the first half of the 1980s the annual increase was a mere 1.7 per cent, triggering a deep-seated consumer crisis, but disposable incomes have since increased by about five per cent a year in real terms.

They have done so due to wage increases, zero inflation and the lower cost of fuel and power.

Disposable income, being the sum remaining after tax and fixed costs such as rent, heating and food, increased from DM225 per month in 1965 to DM1,090 per month in 1986.

The trend toward higher purchasing power is unlikely to decline. Private cash assets in the Federal Republic of Germany are said by the Bundesbank to total DM2,500bn, or DM100,000 per household.

This sum, which includes the cash value of life insurance policies, continues to increase, fuelled by interest payments.

What is more, more life insurance policies than ever will come up for redemption in the years ahead, their annual redemption value virtually doubling to DM40bn by 1995.

This statistical average naturally papers over the seamier side. Just as a growing number of people are living in a land of milk and honey, so a growing number are having to make ends meet on or below the brink of subsistence. They are the unemployed and social security claimants.

Consumer association offices are daily confronted with a dramatic increase in the number of Germans who are hopelessly deep in debt. Their plight is a warning that can easily go unnoticed in the consumer hue and cry.

Cash in hand is not the only reason why the average consumer has grown more self-assured. He (or, again, she) is much better educated and more experienced.

He is not buying his first car or TV set; the next may well be his fifth, for instance.

Since 1960 there has been an educational explosion at German schools from which female consumers in particular have benefited.

There are now nearly five million university graduates in the Federal Republic, and they are bound to have an effect on consumer behaviour.

Mass consumption is on the decline and increasing importance is attached to an individual approach. Quality, not quantity, is now in demand.

Over and above the immediate use to be derived from the product, consumers now expect to benefit in many other ways from what they buy.

Having forfeited ties with their family, their class and their religion they now put new consumer values in their place.

Otto Walter Haseloff, a professor of psychology at the Free University in Berlin, has listed a number of impressive instances of this substitution.

Today's consumers no longer buy clothes with a view to looking just like everyone else (if not more so), aiming at the acme of uniformity; their aim is to arrive at a definition of themselves.

They invest in a life-style rather than a fashion. They identify with the way they dress ("I like wearing black, I prefer one brand or the other").

This outlook is clearly shared by, say, the yuppies. Not for them the cheapest goods on the market; they buy the dearest in order to demonstrate to others that they can afford to do so.

Products establish new modes of communication. You need to be able to hold your own in conversation about personal computers, stereo equipment and cars.

To be able to do so generates a feeling of being a member of the group. In some tennis clubs, for instance, you are an outsider if you don't wear a certain brand — even if a tiny embroidered logo is all that distinguishes it from the rest.

Not the product as such but the point of sale can be what counts. You buy your perfume in a specific body shop, for example.

Last but not least, consumption is also equated with success, especially in the hobby and do-it-yourself sectors.

Yet despite all this interpretation, consumer behaviour remains contradictory in many respects.

Consumers are better informed than ever, have more money than ever, have a wider choice than ever — but do they exercise their right of choice responsibly?

Do they bear in mind, when spending money, the effect of what they buy on the environment? Do they stop to think whether it is socially responsible? Evidently not.

It is too superficial to blame industry for the growing pauperisation in parts of the Third World and for the pollution of

RHEINISCHER MERKUR

water resources and the death of trees and forests yet to dismiss individual responsibility by way of consumer habits.

Entrepreneurial ethics may have much to answer for, but so does the level of standards in consumer ethics.

Consumers, like entrepreneurs, are frequently overtaxed in being expected to bear in mind the standards they feel to be right and important.

Professor Ursula Hansen of Hanover University has pointed out a number of shortcomings. Many consumers, for instance, are simply unaware of the harmful effects of a product, while others are unable to judge because the information at their disposal is contradictory.

How "dangerous" is it, when all is said and done, to buy canned drinks or to eat meat?

Conversely, harmful effects can seldom be clearly assigned to a single product, as was apparent from the discussion whether vehicle emission was to blame for tree deaths.

And even when the effect of a product is a known factor, what sacrifices can consumers be expected to make in opting for an alternative?

Garden fences must be painted every three years if you use environmentally A1 paint — but only every six years if you use conventional paint.

Many consumers prefer the soft option in a situation such as this, arguing that nothing really does any good.

So talk of the "new consumer" is superficial. Consumers may be better informed than ever, but they aren't sufficiently informed. They have yet to learn how to handle their new-found freedom responsibly.

Theo Mönch-Tegeder

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 28 October 1988)

AVIATION

Domestic competition: a little terrier snaps at Lufthansa's heels

No brass bands played and no speeches were made to mark maiden flight No. YP 912 at Riem airport, Munich, on 1 November.

Aero Lloyd preferred not to make a song and dance about its first scheduled flight in Germany.

It is the first time in a long time that Lufthansa's monopoly on major domestic routes has been broken.

Aero Lloyd, the country's fourth-largest charter operator, plans to run an initial 16 flights a day in competition with Lufthansa.

Four aircraft with the Aero Lloyd livery will link Munich, Frankfurt, Hamburg and Düsseldorf, charging fares 10 to 15 per cent below Lufthansa's.

Next summer, if four new aircraft are delivered in time, Aero Lloyd's Walter Schneider may run more domestic services or run regular flights on European routes.

The airline's unpretentious start is not just the result of inexperience in self-portrayal. It is, to some extent, deliberate policy.

Herr Schneider knows that the interest and sympathy Aero Lloyd as a David will get by taking on Lufthansa, a Goliath, is not necessarily enough to keep its aircraft full.

It will be extremely difficult to persuade business passengers to switch allegiance.

They account for an estimated 70 to 80 per cent of domestic traffic, and although large companies are not loath to compare costs, the lower-cost Aero Lloyd flights still have two drawbacks.

One is connected with flight times and the slots allocated to Aero Lloyd at overcrowded German airports.

Some evening flights are very late, Munich-Frankfurt at 21.05 hours, for instance, and Herr Schneider would much prefer to fly earlier in the morning.

The other drawback is that passengers lack flexibility. They can't switch

Frankfurter Allgemeine

to a later or an earlier (Lufthansa) flight; Lufthansa will hear nothing of the idea.

In time Herr Schneider hopes to come to terms with Lufthansa on accepting each other's tickets, with the difference in fare being met either by Aero Lloyd or by the passenger.

The seating on board is more cramped, but in-flight service is not to be reduced. Drinks and sandwiches are served.

Aero Lloyd is the first European airline to use the same aircraft for charter and regular flights.

The 119-seater DC 9s and the 137-seater MD 83s that fly regular morning and evening runs from Monday to Friday go on charter runs during the daytime.

Given the delays that occur, replacement aircraft might have to be kept on standby, and as there are fewer charter flights in winter Aero Lloyd preferred to start regular services at the end of October.

That, it argued, would make the logistics easier. But the Bonn Transport Ministry did not give the go-ahead until July.

It was not until the end of August that contracts were signed to allow Aero Lloyd tickets to be sold via the Start electronic booking system by German travel agents.

Lufthansa, Herr Schneider says, holds a virtual right of veto and can blackball applications to use the computer booking system.

Despite this contractual uncertainty Aero Lloyd took delivery this summer of two McDonnell Douglas MD 87s costing $50m for line services and hired 30 extra staff.

The airline now has a fleet of 11 aircraft, some leased, and they will be joined by four more, costing $110m, next year.

Aero Lloyd, who are about to build a new head office in Oberursel, near Frankfurt, now have a payroll of about 500.

Herr Schneider has no fears about competing with Lufthansa. His company has ample experience of turbulence of all kinds.

Its predecessor filed for bankruptcy in 1980. Its business manager, Wilhelm Stiber, was killed by a pilot shortly afterwards.

In 1981 a fresh start was made under new ownership with three 13-year-old Caravelles (they are still in service).

It was not the best of fresh starts, running up heavy losses.

In 1984 Bogomir Gradisnik, the Yugoslav owner of Air Charter Market, bought 49 per cent of the capital and joined the board.

Fifty-one per cent is held by Reinhold Bräumer, an accountant, and Jan Klimitz, an insurance agent.

Herr Schneider, one of two Aero Lloyd managers, says Mr Gradisnik is the airline's mainspring.

It has earned profits since 1986. Last year seems to have been extremely profitable, given the tourist boom.

In 1987, Herr Schneider says, turnover was DM217m; this year he expects it to total DM300m.

He says Aero Lloyd's share of the German charter market is 10 per cent.

The airline feels sound enough financially to weather a lean initial period. The operation has been costed to break even when 60 per cent of seats are taken, but costs will probably be covered at a lower percentage.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 29 October 1988)

Machinations in the air over Berlin

Süddeutsche Zeitung

The Western Allies launched their Berlin initiative last December in a bid to boost civil aviation to and from the divided city.

Something has now happened, if not what the Allies may have had in mind.

After the brush-off the Soviet Union gave them in a note handed over early last month, East Berlin has now proposed exchanging air safety data with the West Berlin authorities.

This proposal has coincided with somewhat absurd Allied manoeuvres in connection with the winter timetable.

The skies over Berlin are a political minefield. In the final analysis free access to the western part of the city depends on Allied supervision and control of the air corridors to and from the west.

No matter how many treaty arrangements may underpin the existence of West Berlin, Allied control of the air corridors is the ultima ratio.

So the proposal by East Berlin, no matter how unpretentious and common-sense it may sound, can only be considered an attempt to gain access to this extremely sensitive sector.

Desirable though cooperation between airports in East and West might be, there can be no question of East Germany being directly associated with air safety control in Berlin.

Given this political minefield, the timetable dispute is more than annoying. Under the cover of Allied control of the air corridors nothing more nor less than money is at stake.

This is a consideration that cannot be given pride of place, and certainly not in such a coarse manner. Relations with the Allies will otherwise suffer in the long term.

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 2 November 1988)

More flights, more passengers, more delays, more frustration

Deregulation in the principal industrialised countries has played a leading role in the tempestuous development of international civil aviation.

But what has freedom of the skies meant for the consumer? Passengers are increasingly spending hours grounded at overcrowded European airports due to flight delays.

Others patiently wait in aircraft on the runway for take-off permission to be given by control tower staff or, worse still, circle overhead waiting for permission to land.

None of this would have been so necessary if managements had prepared for what was a predictable boom in business and tourist traffic.

Despite such bottlenecks as exist the limits to civil aviation have yet to be reached.

Lufthansa's Günter O. Eser, now head of Iata in Montreal, has advocated what might be called a disagreeable approach to solving the problems of chaotic congestion.

Environmental constraints in building new airports and adding new runways to existing airports must, he says, be abandoned.

Strict bans on night take-offs and landings, as observed in Germany, must be eased to some extent.

The wave of protest that accompanied plans to build a new runway at Rhine-Main airport, Frankfurt, showed how problematic such demands still are.


And despite the problems encountered in handling landings at Rhine-Main no senior airport official has yet seriously suggested using the new runway for landings as well as take-offs.

Yet Herr Eser is anything but unrealistic. At a cautious estimate the number of international civil aviation passengers will double to roughly two billion a year by the end of the century.

Over 11,000 airliners will be in use, or 50 per cent more than now, and the trend will affect us all because we will all be flying more.

So we will all have to change our attitudes toward aircraft, otherwise Herr Eser's warning will come true and drastic congestion will nip the growth of civil aviation in the bud.

A mere two per cent of an average 860 flights a day at Frankfurt exceed the noise ceilings listed in Annex 16.



Lufthansa are replacing their entire fleet of noisy Boeing 727s with A 320 Airbuses and their old Boeing 737-200s by A 300s Airbuses.

The main consideration must definitely be to take swift and effective action to improve intolerable conditions in the air over Europe.

On Lufthansa's initiative the Airspace Users' Planning Bureau started work last summer. Its first brief has been to consider whether and how air safety control in the Federal Republic might be privatised and made more efficient.

German control tower staff are not paid well enough to feel sufficiently motivated to handle an increasing volume of air traffic using inadequate safety equipment.

What is more, swift progress must be made toward setting up Eurocontrol; it has been stymied long enough by the egoism of individual European countries.

Defence Minister Rupert Scholz and Transport Minister Jürgen Warnke have also come to terms on greater use of military airspace by civil aviation.

The next move ought to be talks with East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Scandinavia about greater use of their air corridors by north-south traffic.

These and other considerations, such as civil use of military airfields or auctioning "slots," are unlikely to amount to much more than patchwork.

In the first six months of this year Lufthansa pilots alone logged 4,000 hours circling over German airports waiting for permission to land.

They wasted 18 million litres of aviation fuel in the process. Environmentalists are by no means alone in feeling any further deterioration of the situation would be intolerable.

Because of the growth in air traffic reliably predicted, we will have no choice but to grow used to the idea of more, albeit much reduced, aircraft noise on newly-built runways both by day and at night.

Wilhelm Furler

(Die Welt, Bonn, 2 November 1988)

■ THE ARTS

Ernst Barlach and religion without the dogma

Sculptor, graphic artist and writer Ernst Barlach died in a Rostock *clinic of a heart attack 50 years ago.*

The years of condemnation after the Nazis seized power in 1933 had turned him into a bitter and lonely man.

He was angered not so much by the Nazi ban on his work but by the attacks on him from Nazi circles.

Even before then, in the Weimar Republic, political right-wingers had regarded his work with suspicion. They didn't like the pious, absorbed style of his singing men and weeping women, *the beggars and praying monks* of his sculptures with their pleading gestures and their pensive tranquillity. This did not fit in with the vigorous, nationalist German view of life.

During this period Ernst Barlach was regarded by many as the most important German sculptor of the century. He was non-political but he had done much outside the world of his art to make enemies.

In a radio broadcast he protested *against the exclusion of writer Heinrich* Mann and artist Käthe Kollwitz from the Academy of the Arts during the period the Nazis were *manoeuvring to seize* power.



Proverbs of eternity . . . Ernst Barlach. (Photo: Archives/Piper Verlag)

He did this despite the fact that in 1930 chief Nazi ideologist and thinker Alfred Rosenberg had written in his *Myth of the Twentieth Century* of "the cultural bolshevism of the sub-human world of Kollwitz, Zille, Barlach ..."

Many artists of the period were charged with "cultural bolshevism" and of being "ostisch," implying they were "East Europeans," which, according to Nazi *racial definitions*, implied people inferior to the nordic race. They were also stamped with the "degenerate art" label.

During the 1937 "Cleaning-up Operation" 381 works by Barlach were removed from German museums.

The accusations of incompetent Nazi functionaries that he was "ostisch" were made without understanding but they did in fact have a relevance to his oeuvre.

He was born *in 1870* in Wedel, near Hamburg. After studying in Hamburg and Dresden he went to Paris to explore the treasures of the Louvre.

He had absolutely no interest in the work of modern sculptors and, although he once saw a sculpture of the most famous of the new artists of the time, Auguste Rodin, he was not overwhelmed by it.

In his early days he was influenced by Art Nouveau, but his whole outlook was changed when in 1906 he visited his brother, living in Kharkov, in the Ukraine.

Barlach wrote to his publisher, Reinhold Piper: "I have been in southern Russia for a few months and have had there any number of stimuli, one could even say revelations."

Barlach was a serious North German by *nature, and was humbled by the infinity* of the steppes, the perpetual peace of the small villages, the modesty and poverty of the people who were bowed but not humiliated.

He said that he wanted his art in future to be a profession of the nobility of mankind and creation.

Seen in this light Barlach's art was religious art, but not in the sense of dogmatic theology, but as a symbol of something that fulfilled and gripped the viewer.

It is at this point that our difficulties begin in taking in Barlach's art. The strong forms of his works in wood and bronze share an interior emotion — and *feeling, pathos and solemnity are inadmissible* in our time, expressions regarded with suspicion.

This view is not changed after visiting the completely undramatic exhibition of 200 of his drawings and sculptures which has opened at Cappenberg Castle, Lünen near Dortmund.

The visitor to this exhibition quickly has the impression that he is in a place of worship. This feeling can become almost unbearable if Barlach's sculptures are displayed, "staged" with the help of lighting in other museums. In the 50th anniversary of his death we can also evaluate his literary and dramatic work. His play *Der arme Vetter*, written in 1918, is to be seen in Bremen and *Die echten Sedemunds* (1920) in Hamburg. His *Blauer Boll* has been frequently staged in the past. It is even more difficult to understand the remote literary expressionism of his writings than his sculptural work. Alongside elaborately direct language there are mystical whisperings, jargon is superseded by "proverbs of eternity." Literary critics today regard his dramatic works as a high-point in expressive theatre — and equally they regard these works as almost *unpresentable* on stage.



Remembered best as a sculptor . . . Barlach's *Der Buchleser*, in bronze, 1936. (Photo: Archives)

He will always be much more important to us as a sculptor, who created *not only* individual works of plain people and extensive compositions such as the "Frieze of the Listeners," which can be seen in the Barlach House in Hamburg, but also as a sculptor of splendid commissioned statues. His inwardness and his power of expression predestined him for this work.

Even before 1933 he was planning to realise his massive ideas. Barlach's memorials in Kiel, Lübeck, Magdeburg and Hamburg were not works honouring heroes. *They are rather warnings.*

His most famous work in this genre makes this quite clear. The "Güstrow Angel," hovering in the Güstrow Cathedral, has the countenance of another great artist, Käthe Kollwitz, whose life and art was equally devoted to those who were suffering and oppressed. Like Barlach she was persona non grata among the Nazis a few years later.

Hannes Hardering

(Westdeutsche Allgemeine, Essen, 22 October 1988)

Poles queue up for taste of German culture

Poles have been getting the chance to learn something about cultural life in the Federal Republic.

Their insight came in a week-long programme of performances in Warsaw and other cities by the Stuttgart Ballet and the Theater an der Ruhr, a retrospective of films by Wim Wenders, exhibitions, concerts and academic lectures.

There were some doubts whether a ballet *based on an obsolescent play* by Tennessee Williams, (an American) *A Streetcar Named Desire*, was suitable for the opening of a German Culture Week. But that didn't worry the Poles. They liked it all.

A German cultural institute in Poland *would certainly interest many people.*

Discussions and readings of literary works by writers such as Günter Grass and Horst Bienek showed just how frank relations between Germans and Poles *have become.*

There was a big crowd to hear Grass in a discussion with opposition leaders Adam Michnik and Jan Josef Lipski in the "Hybrydy" student club.

The Poles criticised Grass for being too critical of his own country. They said that freedom *was no longer a gift* but had to be defended.

Lipski expressed the view that Poles wanted to return to "the bosom of Europe" and that they had a right to freedom, *"like the Germans and the French."*

Adam Michnik asked Grass whether he thought it right for leading Social Democrats to have talks "with ministers and generals, indifferent to whether they locked us up or granted us amnesties?"

Grass replied that it was easier for writers to have contacts with members of the *opposition than for politicians.*

He said that there were two aspects to his involvement. He was critical of communism as practised in Russia and the other countries of the East Bloc, but he was not uncritical of the United States.

Grass and Bienek were asked time and *time again about their attitudes* towards their "lost native country," Danzig (now Gdansk) for Grass and Upper Silesia for Bienek.

Here it was noteworthy how one can now *talk about themes of this sort* in Poland which were once taboo and aroused considerable emotion.

Grass attracted applause and laughter when he recalled that at the beginning of the 1960s in Gdansk he had overheard a German and a Pole arguing bitterly about whether *Copernicus* was a German or a Pole.

Grass said: "I found the discussion idiotic and boring. Then I made up a story. I said that according to one genealogical source Copernicus was neither German nor Pole but Kasubian. Immediately I had the German and the Pole against me."

One Pole said it was time the German cultural inheritance in the once-German but now-Polish territories should be recognised.

Grass was applauded when he said these territories were Polish because Germany had started the war and lost it. But he said that an end should be made to arguments about Slavic or Germanic origins.

In a discussion with Bienek in Warsaw an elderly man complained that only now could Poles in any numbers visit the birthplace of their national poet Adam Mickiewicz in Lithuania, now a Soviet Republic.

He said that there was a Mickiewicz Museum but all the inscriptions on the exhibits were in Russian.

Grass visits Poland every three years, "when I am let in," and still has relatives near Gdansk. But Gleiwitz (now Gliwise), near Katowice, is only a place remembered from childhood for Bienek.

He read an exerpt from his book, recently published, about his first journey to Gleiwitz, which had depressed him.

Asked if in his discussions with home*sick Silesians who had returned to visit* Silesia whether he had met anyone who wanted to remain for good he said, "Not a single one."

Bienek defended those who wanted to leave Poland today. *He said he did not like* hearing talk of "real Poles," who, wanting a better life in the West, looked for a German grandfather.

He said that it was the right of every individual to go where he or she wanted to go. He pointed out that not so long ago *people had been murdered because they* were "real Jews."

Some East Germans took part in the discussions, taking full advantage of the freer atmosphere on the Polish side of the River Oder.

Renate Marschidpe

(General-Anzeiger, Bonn, 24 October 1988)

■ EXHIBITIONS

1,000 years of Jews in Bavaria: a tale of humiliation and persecution

The fate of Jews down the ages is the graphically displayed in an exhibition in Nuremberg: *it shows how the Jewish* minority in almost all eras was mocked and humiliated, persecuted and murdered, again and again.

One photograph shows people on the teats of a pig, an unclean animal for Jews.

It does not come, as perhaps you might expect, *from the Nazi newspaper, Der Stürmer*, but is of a stone laid in the first half of the 15th century in the former monastery in Heilsbronn.

The depiction of the "Jewish pig" appeared *in churches in many countries in* the Middle Ages, in Germany in the cathedrals of Cologne, Magdeburg and Regensburg.

Most of the 850 exhibits in Nuremberg, loaned from 160 institutions from all over the world, are witness to Jewish belief, but *no-one can ignore the documents* which show distress and threat.

The exhibition is at the Germanisches Nationalmuseum and is called: "Look, the stone is screaming out of the wall;" *and is subtitled: "Jewish History* and Culture in Bavaria."

The Nationalmuseum and the House of Bavarian History have given particular importance to the Jewish religion and customs because the ignorance of people

NÜRNBERGER Nachrichten

of different religious persuasion has often been at the root of pogroms.

Under 10 headings the exhibition reviews the thousand-year history of the Jews in Bavaria. It began in the 10th century *when Jewish merchants were al*lowed to ply their trade in Regensburg.

In the 12th and 13th centuries other Bavarian towns admitted Jews.

Since Christians were forbidden to deal in usury, Jewish money-lenders quickly had a monopoly in the business, which often brought them success and wealth, but also made their fellow citizens envious and resentful of them.

These Jews brought their religion with them, which was incomprehensible to Christians *and therefore seemed mysterious.*

Festival days were different to those celebrated in the Christian religion, the symbols of Jewish belief were different to those in the churches.


The exhibition shows reconstructions of synagogues and ritual objects made of gold and silver. It tries to show Jewish customs and traditions to generations in Bavaria who actually saw the holocaust or who learned about it with after the dis*integration* of the Third Reich.

The Jews had developed a rich cultural and religious life in the cities of the Middle Ages, but their position was always endangered.

They not only dealt in money but also had to use money to make the emperor and nobles well-disposed towards them.

Merchants, for instance, had to have a pass to cross over the many frontiers in fragmented Germany of the Middle Ages. Even Jews who served at court had to *keep their lords in a good mood with gifts* such as a costly centrepiece for the dinner table.

The Jews were expelled from the cities of the Holy Roman Empire, the then centres *of economic activity, in the decades* before 1500. More expulsions of Jews from the dukedom of Bavaria followed in 1533.



Section of wooden ceiling panelling from a synagogue painted between 1738-39 by Elieser Sussmann. The panel, 3.65 metres by 3.95 metres, is on loan from the Hällisch-Frankisches Museum, Schwäbisch Hall. (Photo: Catalogue)

They made their way from Bavaria to the rural areas of Franconia and Swabia where they were welcomed by the knights of the Holy Roman Empire

Considerable space is given over in the exhibition to the life of rural Jews. In many areas of Franconia and Swabia Jews made up as much as 40 per cent of *the total rural population*, in some instances they were in the majority.

The section shown in this exhibition about rural Jews is a link with the present: not a single Jew lives in these rural areas *today.*

Nuremberg provides an example from the past of how religious motives concealed the economic background for the hatred of Jews.

Emperor Karl IV gave the city's patri*cians a licence to murder Jews in presenting* them with a market charter in 1349.

The citizens immediately tore down the ghetto on the central marketplace and killed the Jewish inhabitants.

The Church of Our Lady on the Hauptmarkt in Nuremberg is today a witness of the emperor's bad conscience. At midday the jacks of the clock appear as the seven electors who come to swear allegiance to the emperor, who founded the church.

Fürth has earned a special exhibition of *its own, for the city offered the Jews refuge* when the anti-semitic Nuremberg city council expelled Jewish citizens in 1498-1490.

The dean of the cathedral in Bamberg and the Margrave of Ansbach, as *rulers* of Fürth, were particularly interested in the settlement of prosperous families, who could pay high taxes, who could acquire land and build new houses.

Growing Jewish community profited once more from trade and money-lending *with the merchants of Nuremberg, and re*vived trades and manufacturing in Fürth.

The city's rulers spoiled their wealthy subjects with special rights. The Jews had a seat and a vote in the local council and *participated in community legislation.* They had their own administration and their own courts.

It is not surprising that in 1811 the Jewish community in Fürth numbered 2,623, the largest Jewish community in the country.

Fürth lost its special position when, in the heyday of industrialisation, the Jews in Germany were granted equal rights under the law as other citizens.

Theoretically from 1870-1871 they *were treated as other citizens, but in practice* it was rather different. Jews had difficulties getting posts in universities and in making a career in the civil service.

Even during the Weimar Republic Jews were harassed by the ban on the Jewish ritual slaughter of animals. The Third Reich dealt Jewish citizens the ultimate blow. There are now only 5,500 Jews living in Bavaria.

Walter Schatz

(Nürnberger Nachrichten, 25 October 1988)

Porcelain people to celebrate across the German divide

The state-run East German makers of up-market porcelain in Meissen are opening up to the West. Visitors from the West were once *unwelcome*. Not any more. The works is even establishing contact with businesses in the West. Readers of a Munich magazine are being given a special offer to buy items of porcelain inscribed with personal initials; and the head of the works is to go *to West Berlin to take part in celebrations by KPM, the royal porcelain* works.

Frederick the Great bought the Royal *Porcelain Factory in Berlin, (it is in* present-day West Berlin)famous for its German initials of KPM, from a merchant, Ernst Gotzkowski, in 1763 for 225,000 thalers.

Kings liked the best porcelain: *the* finest relief work was entwined around the cups and plates; turrines and bowls were decorated with gilt mosaics or *crimson* flowers. Frederick himself had a morbid taste when it came to colour. He favoured a service *in* "bleu mourant," languishing blue. The 225th anniversary of the Prussian King's purchase of the factory is being celebrated in the Charlottenburg Castle, the former Berlin summer residence of the Prussian kings, with *an exhibition of the* famous KPM's Wellington Service. Friedrich Wilhelm III presented this to the *Duke* of Wellington in gratitude for his victory over Napoleon at Waterloo. Johann Ernst Gotzkowsky wrote about how the Prussian porcelain factory came to be established. He recalled the decisive meeting with Frederick the Great: "His Majesty had brought to his room a few sam*ples of Saxon porcelain. He explained* that he wanted similar porcelain, but from a factory in his own land."

Only the best was good enough . . . exhibit from Berlin porcelain exhibition. (Photo: H. Garbs)

So Gotzkowski founded a works in Berlin and lured the best tradesmen from the stronghold of porcelain manufacture, Meissen near Dresden.

Today pieces of the famous "Bleu mourant" KPM service are produced by hand in Berlin, using the old moulds.

The factory has a well-filled order-book and much value is put on good rel*ations* with its *former competitor* in Meissen.

The director of the Meissen factory, Reinhard Fichte, is taking part in the KPM anniversary celebrations.

Ralph Stiewe, KPM *spokesman in* Berlin, said: "We do not feel ourselves to be competitors with Meissen. Each factory has its specialities. We produce services. Figurines are better in Meissen."

Angelika Kleeblatt

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 22 October 1988)

■ MEDICINE

Doctors' stubborn attitudes to treatment of cancer

Fear, hopelessness, despair — few complaints give rise to as many unpleasant emotions as cancer.

Health insurance schemes, medical associations and a cancer research organisation have appealed for more people to turn up for cancer checks.

The health insurance schemes spend well over DM500m a year on cancer checks. The sooner a malignant tumour is identified, the likelier it can be cured, the argument runs.

It seems to be true of many kinds of cancer, but *not all. In some cases it evidently* makes no difference.

Despite a seemingly limitless range of *new cancer drugs and* despite increasingly sophisticated diagnostic and radiation equipment many kinds of cancer are not spotted until *it is too late.*

The number of cancer deaths is steadily increasing, so precautionary measures are clearly needed — if only because the all-clear relieves pent-up anxiety that may also cause cancer.

Yet what happens to a woman who is found to have a malignant breast tumour? *She is sent to the nearest hospital* for treatment that amounts to little more than a lottery.

Few if any hospital doctors are prepared to explain to patients that there are methods of treating cancer (other than the one *they* prefer) that can be taken seriously. So the patient has no choice. Depending on the doctor's

Hannoversche Allgemeine

school of thought and assessment of the situation, surgery may be any of three options.

It may be "off with her breast" or part of it or merely the tumour, leaving the remaining tissue in place.

In retrospect any doctor can justify any of these approaches, but it would be preferable for the patient to consult several doctors before agreeing to surgery.

There is always the medical examiner, a doctor appointed by insurance companies but equally at the patient's disposal when a second opinion is felt to be needed.

Besides, patients have a right to know why one course of treatment is approved (and underwritten) by the health insurance and others aren't.

As matters stand, a patient who has undergone surgery, radiation and chemotherapy may then be told by an advocate of biological cancer treatment that *everything done in hospital cancer* wards is a waste of time.

Thirty to 50 per cent of cancer patients are said to die of the repercus*sions of chemotherapy rather than of* cancer.

The advocate of alternative medicine will say, in a manner no less dubiously definite than that of practitioners of established medicine, that treating tumours alone is not enough.

Just as conventional medics defend the use of scalpels and radiation therapy, the alternative medic says cancer is not a complaint that can be localised.

In his view it is a general complaint that can only be treated by other means, such as a radical transformation of the *patient's way of life.*

Anyone who keeps track of the publications that document the disputes over the causes and treatment of cancer can but hope never to suffer from it personally.

Cancer may be lethal; it has definitely come to be a hotly contested, indispensable economic factor.

Statistically speaking, one German in *six will suffer from it. It provides* thousands of doctors with a livelihood. It ensures substantial turnover for research institutes, drug and medical equipment manufacturers, chemists and pharmacists, hospitals and clinics.

With a growing number of specialists keen to cash in on the proceeds of a market the public sector has generously helped to finance, the struggle for a slice of the cake is waged ever faster and more furiously.

Regardless of the patients, who feel insecure and are beset by doubt and de*spair, conventional doctors dismiss* their alternative colleagues, whose methods are, perhaps, open to criticism, as charlatans.

The alternative medics in turn dismiss their conventional colleagues as members of a medical Mafia and accuse them of withholding from their patients what are promising courses of treatment. Disputes of this kind are irresponsible. They nip in *the bud hopes that might be justified* and paralyse the self-preservation instinct so essential for sheer survival.

Comments made by patients themselves often shed a disgraceful light on members of the medical profession.

Doctors are keenly interested in tumours and treat them with care and attention; the poor patients are left very much to their own devices, in the lurch with their mental anguish in the day-to*day routine of hospital.*

Since no doctor can seriously dispute that the patient's state of mind has a decisive influence on how he or she comes to terms with the complaint, the "look, no words" course of cancer treatment is a sign of either inadequate medical qualification or an irresponsible desire to get rich quick.

Prevention is undeniably better than cure. But if it is to do the patient any good, treatment and after-care must become more humane.

And doctors must admit to their pa*tients that while there are many ways of* treating cancer no-one can say for sure which approach is right in the given instance.

Eyke Gerster

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 1 November 1988)

Lung tumours no smokers' privilege

Lung cancer is not a smoker's privilege. An estimated 4 to 12 per cent of lung cancer patients owe it to exposure to radon, a rare radioactive gas.

As men and women differ in their liability to contract cancer, between 25 and 90 men and 5 and 18 women a year can be expected to suffer from lung cancer due to radon exposure.

These figures, which are numbers per million male or female inhabitants of the Federal Republic, were discussed in detail at a seminar held in Frankfurt am Main by the Society for Radiation and Environmental Research (GSF).

Reports from the United States of radiation occasionally exceeding 10,000 becquerels per cubic metre of air in *American homes* have upset *German* scientists.

Did they herald a Chernobyl in the airing cupboard?

Radon is a gas that occurs naturally in the Earth's crust and atmosphere. But it has been found at such high levels in private homes that radiation protection officials have more than once been called in — and made recommendations.

Radon exposure indoors, they say, ought not to exceed 250 becquerels per cubic metre. Higher levels are said by *specialists in environmental medicine to* double the average lung cancer risk. Action is then called for.

Radon finds its way into living rooms in various ways.

It is released from subterranean geological strata and finds its way into the topsoil (or stone). It then usually finds its way into the atmosphere and is rapidly diluted, doing no further damage.

But it often comes to a halt beneath concrete foundations, is collected and leaks *through a crack into the cellar.*

It is three times as heavy as ordinary air but swiftly permeates the cellar and *is wafted round the home.*

The GSF's Dr Josef Peter took a dim view of the insulation advice given to do-it-yourself home improvers:

"They are advised to put in double glazing and to insulate old buildings, yet never a mention is made of the radon risk."

Yet radon can indeed be *enriched in* the home as a result of insulation and double glazing. The resulting radioac*tivity averages 50* becquerels per cubic metre of air, or roughly 10 times the average level outdoors.

This figure was arrived at by the Karlsruhe nuclear research centre after tests in a random sample of 6,000 homes in the Federal Republic of Germany.

One per cent were found to tick away at over 250 Bq and 0.1 per cent to register over 500 Bq per cubic metre. In in*dividual instances radiation levels of up* to 3,000 Bq were measured.

Karl Jenniches, health resort director at Bad Kreuznach, has a soft spot for radon. "In our radon workings," he says, "nearly 30,000 patients a year recover from rheumatism, arthritis and respiratory complaints."

On average, patients spend seven half-hour sessions exposed to up to 100,000 Bq per cubic metre.

*Herr Jenniches says patients show def*inite signs of improvement. He attributes them to the stimulative effect of radioactive Radon 222 on the adrenal gland.

The radiation safety commission sees no need to lay down statutory levels for treatment of this kind under medical supervision, but it would very much like to reduce radon exposure in private homes.

That would presuppose a check of the radon count in each and every home. *The Ministry of the Environment,* Nature Conservation and Reactor Safety in Bonn will supply details of research institutes that analyse samples of air.

Martin Boeckh

(Die Welt, Bonn, 28 October 1988)

■ NEW BIOCENTRE OPENED

Harnessing schizosaccharomyces pompe and debating about moral limits

The new biocentre at Brunswick University of Technology is one of the most ultra-modern research facilities in the country in a key technology. Gernot Müller-Serten went along to see for himself. He reports for the *Hannoversche Allgemeine.*

After passing through a door that *looks like it means business* and walking along a cool corridor bathed in neon light we arrive in the central research laboratory at Brunswick University's new biocentre.

It smells of fresh paint, with not a trace of the sulphur typical of most laboratories, and in other respects too it has nothing in common with the alhemist's kitchen where Faust produced his test-tube homunculus.

Biotechnology, the scientific discipline that ranks alongside nuclear research in creating an international uproar, has a surprisingly harmless look.

Here in Brunswick it seems to consist of an orderly array of laboratory apparatus with ultra-modern, brand new chrome-plated equipment and stacks of electronic devices.

The typical biotech laboratory must be about the most boring place in the world. Not *even the yellow warning* signs that stand for radioactive material are likely to make anyone shake in his shoes.

In outward appearance the genetic engineer's workplace is both prosaic and the same the world over.

Workbenches are full of bottles, plastic containers, pipettes and assorted equipment, including a mallet that alone, by twisting the imagination a *little, might conjure visions of the* witch's hammer.

In reality, perfectly ordinary people do everyday work here. They are not particularly reverential about what, for some, is the stuff of nightmares.

What they pour into funnels, beakers, test-tubes and steel containers is simply chemicals: molecules that can be broken apart, cut up and dissolved — just like other substances.

Even the incubators where opaque, evil-smelling brews bubble away at 37° C (98° F) are nothing like chambers of horrors.

These are the incubators where bacteria, especially the genetic engineer's favourite, E. coli, multiply a millionfold overnight.

It is hard, in such an unspectacular environment, to envisage unscrupulous scientists one day having no qualms about *manipulating human genes.*

Instead, the young and strikingly level-headed Brunswick biochemists are enthusiastic about the possibility of developing a "green chemistry" to reconcile ecology and economy.

They envisage methods enabling mankind to put bacteria and fungi to work as hard-working microscopic factories, supplying sophisticated medicines and serums on demand.

*They have visions of developing var*ieties of plant that protect themselves from pests and diseases, boost their own yields and even supply their own fertiliser.

They talk in terms of microbial soil purification and of the mighty microbe processing drinking-water, leaching ore and purifying ground water.

They refer to the special properties of schizomycetous yeast. They are keenly *interested in regulating its sexual cycle.*

The Brunswick boffins are equally interested in the mechanics of genetic recombination and of the DNA repair work of Schizosaccharomyces pompe.

It interests them because they hope it will help them to identify the make-up of DNA, short for deoxyribonucleic acid, a molecule that contains the entire genetic substance of a living creature, a complete encyclopaedia, as it were, with *a gene corresponding to a single page.*

Brownish masses bubble in large steel containers. They look for all the world like yeast dough rising.

Young scientists refer with a smile to "our monster bacteria." They may at some later stage be converted into biocatalysts at the department of industrial chemistry.

In firmly sealed globules or fibres they are already put to practical use in *extracting nitrates from drinking water* or manufacturing champagne.

Alongside the faceless concrete boxes of the new blocks on the university campus the biocentre has an almost filigree look with its loosely arranged architecture.

It cost roughly DM35m and was built in a record two-and-a-half years in mid-campus.

Professor Bernd Rebe, the univers*ity's president,* says that proves that university construction work can still be carried out most effectively where the *state has come to realise that a backlog* exists.

He is proud of his university's latest addition. Had it not been for his commitment it might well not have been allocated to Brunswick.

The idea, he says, first occurred to him and Professor Klein of the Biotech Research Association during a walk in the woods in autumn 1984. His ideas were welcomed at both *Land* and Fed*eral government level.*

Brunswick was an obvious choice as the existing location of the Biotech Research Association (GBF), the *Federal* Biological Research Establishment (BBA) and the Federal Agricultural Research Establishment (FAL).

This research grouping, to which Professor Rebe attaches great importance, lays the groundwork for effective basic research in a sector that is international*ly regarded as a key technology.*

It must be developed, he says, to handle the challenges that will be posed by the demand for foodstuffs, environmental protection, medicine, energy and commodity supplies in the decades ahead.

He feels it to be self-evident that the Federal Republic of Germany must keep abreast of the brisk pace of international developments in biotechnology.

In launching the Brunswick biocentre Lower Saxony has opened an important *door to the future, he says. The region* stands to benefit from the combination of future-orientated research and industry.

Professor Rebe notes that the Brunswick research establishments are already surrounded by a cluster of modern industrial companies.

If it is to offset the German north-south divide Lower Saxony has no choice but to combine its advanced technology *potential in both science* and industry.

Professor Rebe would like to see the Hanover-Brunswick region developed into a high tech centre. The scientific potential certainly exists, he says.

Yet he warns against expecting too much too soon. Where the labour market is concerned he compares what has now begun with the working of a flywheel:

"*It is slowly starting to turn.* As we turn it faster and faster it will attract more and more jobs, and I can imagine it *having a perceptible effect on the la*bour market in a few years' time."

At present Brunswick has 30 places for students of biotechnology and a further 30 for students of biochemical process engineering. Ten times as many apply.

The biocentre consists of depart*ments* of biochemistry and biotechnology, microbiology, genetics, process engineering and technical chemistry.

All departments are interlinked and constitute crucial biotech research disciplines. Their laboratories are amongst the most modern in the country.

Keeping a genetic step ahead of the international Joneses . . . the Brunswick biocentre. (Photo: Jens Krone)

Genetic engineering, the most controversial sector of biotechnology, plays a strictly limited role in Brunswick as yet.

Cages for laboratory animals have *been installed at the biocentre* but they will stay empty for some time, Professor Rebe says.

The only rats are, *in all probability,* the ones in the cellar of a dilapidated old shed in the campus grounds.

It can't be demolished because an artist who lives and works there has taken his case to court and been found to be entitled to stay there for good.

He refuses to go despite the most generous offers of compensation, including an apartment in a block of new flats.

Brunswick research scientists are particularly keen to make use of the specific opportunities provided by combining biotech, process engineering and engineering in general.

"We are less interested in cutting up genes," Professor Rebe says, "than in putting biotech to industrial use."

Human genetics is taboo, he and all Brunswick scientists are agreed. But aren't moral standards realigned in keeping with the tasks set?

Scientists who work with bacteria definitely feel their work is less alarming *than that of scientists who do harmless* work on laboratory mice.

Those who work with mice may feel working with rabbits is the *borderline.*

Hannoversche Allgemeine

Those who work with rabbits probably feel working with monkeys is dubious.

Those who work with monkeys doubtless feel that experimenting on hu*mans is the borderline.*

Visitors to Brunswick are briefed at length on laboratory equipment and the importance of *E. coli* bacteria in genetic engineering.

They are made to part company with any naive idea they may have had that cutting up genes is done with scissors or scalpels. They are taught instead that "dissection" is carried out chemically.

Yet, inevitably, every conversation about biotech ends up by discussing ethical considerations.

In common with everyone who has *dealt with the subject in detail,* Professor Rebe feels that the debate, which ranges from innocuous clichés to horrific visions, has not been conducted objectively.

He is well aware of the fears some people have of irresponsible research scientists working away behind the red-brick walls of the biocentre, evilly perverting nature.

But he is no less mistrustful of others who euphorically hold forth the promise of new technologies that will be a blessing to mankind.

Professor Rebe *would be happy to* spike the curriculum with lectures on ethics and philosophy. "In this sector," he says, "we are moving into spheres of scientific development where the conceivable consequences and potential hazards can only be responsibly considered by means of intensive reflection."

At present, however, he lacks staff qualified to lecture in these subjects. The limits to biotechnology in Brunswick are, as he sees it:

"We will not be undertaking experiments in human genetics here, and we *will definitely not* be *trying to interfere* in the work of creation."

Gernot Müller-Serten

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 28 October 1988)

■ HORIZONS

No social revolution, but a picture of the whole man is slowly emerging

The fate of the German man is work. Kaputt at night, cruelly clean shaven and tired and in the morning, 30 days *holiday a year.*

That's the way it is for almost all German men almost all their lives between the ages of 20 and 60. They are helped in domestic matters by a woman as if they were as incapable as their children.

That's the way they want it. Or do they? Are there some who would like it *another way?*

Informatics specialist Klaus Haas says: "The idea had been bubbling about in me for a long time." He is a department head at his firm for 11 days a month (that's right!). He used to have a hefty salary, lived in a superb house and he travelled — but he had the feeling *that there must be something else to life.*

He just had to change his job. So he did. Now he has plenty of time for art, for tai chi. And he has a small garden.

Konrad Heidkamp teaches German, politics and history. For six years he has worked just 12 hours a week. Why? "I couldn't have lasted out much longer." *He could count on the fingers of one* hand the weekends when he didn't have to do marking.

Friday afternoons, he remembers with a laconic laugh, were frustrated shopping days, buying four records at the same time and having the time to hear none of them. Then he became a father and was able to enjoy that. Now, he writes music critiques as a hobby.

Christoph Reichel has been a houseman for 12 years. It wasn't planned that

DIE ZEIT

way but, all the same, it was unavoidable after he had given up his job as a building consultant with a trade union. He moved to the country to be with his girlfriend so that she could stay in her teaching job. He says that he could never imagine a woman giving everything up for him.

In any event, he found no work in the country. So he raised three children, renovated an old house and obtained a few sheep. He *ran the household* and, in short, did much that a man in employment could scarcely hope to do.

At the weekly market, he drinks coffee with housewives. His father, a university professor, "a performance-oriented person who has achieved much," had recently admitted that *he envied the son's lifestyle.*

Reichel, Heidkamp and Haas belong to a rare group of men who seldom meet their like — and who wouldn't have been the subject of newspaper articles had it not been for two good reasons.

First is the wish of many women to share all facets of their lives with a man *instead of merely relieving him of the* less loved household chores and thereby foregoing a career.

Second, a growing amount of evidence to indicate that there are men willing to share the work. It is estimated that there are at least 300,000 housemen in this country and that the number *could be substantially more.*

Ten per cent of all men would gladly work less, according to a study by Berlin researchers. What is more astounding: the proportion among younger well-educated men in jobs usually regarded as demanding and which tend to *limit private life is 20 per cent.*

Professor Burkhard Strümpel, one of the authors of the study, *Teilzeitarbeit Männer und Hausmänner*, talks about a cultural change having taken place.

Strümpel argues that if all these men did what they wanted, not only would it be possible for their own wives all to *work, but also all the unemployed people* throughout the length and breadth of the country. But, he asks, do they really want to?

It is difficult to believe that they do. At Daimler-Benz headquarters, a search for qualified people wanting to work reduced hours was unsuccessful. *Down the road at the opposition car*maker firm of BMW, a few specialist workers were working part-time. This was possible because of advances in technology. But no one in management. At one of the big four commercial banks, Commerzbank, no senior part-time worker in any of its branches was found.

A director of Siemens cannot remember a single case in 33 years where a colleague has asked to be allowed to work shorter hours. The thought, unthinkable for someone *perhaps* who for 33 years has started work at eight in the morning and often sees his wife only at 11 o'clock at night again, reveals itself at the most in wisecracks. Yes, he says to his wife, you stay here from Monday to Wednesday and you from Thursday to Friday and I stay here only at the weekend.

It pays to think about why the idea of organising at the very least their working day as they want is unthinkable for many men. Naturally it is not only a matter of unbaring the male soul to account for a fair division of labour among the sexes or to account for why Papa is there for the children only on Saturdays. Children who see their father only on Saturday and Sunday become like either father or mother. The habit passes on to the next generation.

"When I grow up, I want a husband who will stay at home just like Papa," recently announced the 12-year-old daughter of Christoph Reichel. Dorothy Dinnerstein, *a psychologist, wrote that* if more men were housemen and fewer women merely housewives, our attitudes to the world and environment would be revolutionised.

Why then this unwished unhappiness of many men? In the the words of Frau Dinnerstein, "the disinclination to give *up privileges and a simple aversion to* stopping exploiting other people."

Is it simply the power of habit? Or something more like a fear of being replaced? One senior official in a Bonn ministry which we have agreed not to name says: "They would say I was mad. They would say that someone else *should take my place.*"

The confession of having interests apart from those of career are here, "where much more is apparent than real," embarrassing like everything to do with private life. And it is very much a case of being in the system so deep that it is impossible to get out.

Then come the illusions of self-importance ("It is impossible to divide up my work"), participation in power that means constant availability ("a minister might ring at any minute") plus an income direly needed because so many different things are needed for the *children (and the wife has not been an* earner for years).

If all other arguments fail, the mortgage argument wins out: it has to be paid. Said our senior official in Bonn: "I work and I dream."

There are also a catalogue of little reasons that mitigate against shorter *working hours; that it is only for the* badly paid, for the old or for the ill or for someone or something else so that the idea never develops from its nascence as a scantling of a notion, a scintilla in the remote reaches of the cranium which is beyond the cerebral lucubrating powers to convert into a simple six-hour day or a four-day week or even a sabbatical.

Women's work is naturally that housework that a man would have to face if he decided to go home early from work.

It is that activity that takes half an hour to get out of the way if it's organised properly; or so he thought until confronted with the reality that half an hour is barely enough time to get off the blocks. In a way, it is Mama's fault that she manages to propagate the myth by *cleaning and clearing and washing and* polishing and dusting before anybody notices that there is anything that needs to be cleaned and cleared and washed and polished and dusted in the first place.

Another factor that might dawn on him is the reality that children are not just little *crumb-dispensing monsters.* Peter Droste von Vischering, a teacher of religion in Westphalia, says that fathers who have their children only for the usual 40 minutes at night should not be fathers at all. He has four and, like his wife, has only a half job. He proclaims he is in general satisfied.

Men who do not live just for their careers find themselves that they lead more satisfactory existences than their more zealous colleagues. Financial loss doesn't depress them because other things have taken on greater importance.

So firms reject employees' wishes for shorter working hours because they fear an avalanche of applications.

Strümpel therefore doesn't want to be quoted as an optimist. New forms of work must be developed and even the trade unions are now coming round to that idea. But this will only happen when women stand up and insist. So we haven't yet approached the point where it can be said: a dream man for mama.

Susanne Mayer

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 28 October 1988)



(Photo: Lutz Fischmann/Groninger)

Decision to sack teachers in collar-and-tie case overturned

A school's decision to dismiss three teachers without notice because they went to classes without wearing ties is invalid.

An industrial tribunal in Freiburg, in the Black Forest, found that although the private Lippold School was right in requiring that teachers should be correctly dressed, it could not lay down that ties must be worn.

The tribunal ruled that any such agreement specifically dealing with ties would have to be first agreed between employers and staff and not unilaterally decided by the employers.

The school is a family-run commercial college headed by Rolf Lippold. His deputy, Thomas Lippold, minced no words about one of the three teachers, who are still teaching at the school: "I only want to say that he is a bone-idle teacher."

The head of the tribunal said that this teacher was a spokesman for the staff and, as such, could not be dismissed without notice. To which Rolf Lippold said: "If that is so, the law is not appropriate for our school."

An appeal by the tribunal head for both parties to take the case before an arbitrator was rejected. An earlier attempt to find a solution through an independent party had also failed.

One of the three teachers said that the battle of the ties was really not the issue at all. He said a new works council had been elected.

Two of the dismissed teachers belonged to it. "*It was elected a year ago* and, ever since, the school has been trying to abolish it. That is the crux of the problem."

But the Lippolds are sticking to their guns. They asked if it were immoral to ask teachers to wear ties. It had to be possible to distinguish teachers from pupils.

To which counsel for the teachers asked: "And what would happen if suddenly all the pupils turned up in collar and tie?"

Ulla Bettge

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 22 October 1988)

■ FRONTIERS

No blockheads allowed here: Munich's doorman has become a cult figure

The role of the doorman is different in Munich. People from other parts of Germany find that out when they are stopped *from entering a cafe or night club — and that can lead to trouble.* For the Munich doorman is a highly prized employee. It is he who maintains the flavour of the house by selecting whose face, or dress, or disposition (or anything) fits in and whose *doesn't. Stephan Lebert came down from Nuremberg to re*port for the readers of the *Nürnberger Nachrichten.*

No blockheads are allowed in Munich's Park-Café. That's official. Hansi Grandl, 29, who manages the place with his wife, Ine, says so.

They both weed out the blockheads by taking turns standing at the door and giving the customers the once over.

In no other city in Germany has the unsmiling doorman risen to such a powerful position. He is treated with respect; people fawn as if he were a Mafia god-father. If a doorman calls someone by their first name, it is taken as an honour.

He comes into his own as the night grows. Around midnight, crowds of people gather outside the doors of the city's discotheques and nightclubs. Most *of them are young. They want to go inside.* But they have been refused. At weekends, they would willingly pay 10 or 15 marks — but money isn't enough.

A student is given a long scrutinising look. Then the doorman asks if he has a grey jacket and a yellow tie. "Yes," says the student. "Good, then go home, *change and come back." The student* did.

Another young man, perhaps 20, standing at the door of another night spot, made the mistake of asking why he had to stand outside.

After a few moments, a head belonging to a clearly irritated body appeared *round the door*: "Easy. *Some people* make a positive impression. Some people make a negative impression. You make a negative impression."

Doormen in Munich have become an institution. They call themselves "guardians of exclusivity." There is hardly a nightclub or a trendy pub that doesn't *have one.*

Munich's Nachtcafé, Wolkenkratzer, Wunderbar or Park-Café are all successful. All have been opened over the past three years. The man at the door *plays* a crucial role.

One Tuesday afternoon at Park-Café, a film was to be made. There was a *crowd of smartly dressed, yuppie-looking,* young people milling about, hoping to be taken on as extras for the film.

Hansi Grandl took me to his office, where it was quieter, to tell me about his criteria "for the door."

He said the job had a lot to do with *intuition.* "You watch a person approaching, the way he walks, his manner, how he looks," he said.

There were a few hard and fast rules. "Anyone who looks like a sales girl, hair done in a permanent wave, doesn't have a chance. Anyone wearing an olive-green jacket. That's bad. The worst is a walrus moustache. People with walrus moustaches are primitive. We don't want them."

He said he had a good eye. "When someone comes to the door wearing polyester trousers and has a certain look about *him, he's just a ticket-collector* type. We don't want people of that sort."

It was astonishing how many people had bad taste, wore impossible clothes and were generally hopeless cases.

"I let people in who look as if they have money or something special about them. I don't let in people who are a little suspicious and loud," he said.

I asked him why Schumann's, Munich's top bar, did not have a doorman. Grandl said: "People go there to chat. Plebs don't think about conversation, so they don't go there. We offer music so everyone comes to us."

The world-view of a professional *nightclub operator is as simple as that.*

Hansi Grandl has once had his shoulder dislocated and a finger broken standing at the door of his pub, despite the fact that behind the door a hefty bouncer is standing at the ready, his bodyguard.

"Basically the job is highly dangerous. *You never know when someone will* pull out a knife," he said.

Thomas Bedall, 37, is a trained social worker. He used to be politically very active and, as he admitted, subscribed to left-wing newspapers "which I valued because of their intellectual depth."

He and a friend own the Wunderbar. He says: "Munich is a centre of the film industry and fashion and it is a rich city. Politics and critical attitudes are out. People want to enjoy themselves in public, have some exclusivity and look good.

"A night spot in Munich must take these needs into consideration. If we had not had a doorman we would have gone down long ago."

Guests often complained that "peculiar *people" were allowed in. Bedall says* people seek a clique they belong to, where they can feel apart from Tom, Dick and Harry.

The doorman at the Wunderbar, Richard Scholze, says that the bar's regulars sometimes proudly bring their parents along to show them their pub.

Bedall says that, back in the 1960s, particularly during the student unrest of the late 1960s, doormen were simply out. Now they were part of the scene.

Scholze said that he got a lot out of *his job, "being able to weigh up a person* at a glance."

At a glance? Late that evening he kept out quite a lot of people by just looking at them once.

The pub was half-full. Most people were listening to the music, some were drinking at the bar, a couple were dancing. Among the faces I saw one man with a black moustache. How had he managed to get in? How did he get through the scrutiny at the door?

Two beautiful girls dressed stylishly in black thought it "quite normal" to have a doorman. They had not given the moustache another thought.

One said: "We are regulars." In anticipation of further questions neither of them could find anything wrong with having a doorman.

Many customers regard him as essential. One said: "I want to enjoy myself here with amusing and interesting people and not with just anyone."

Anyone who turned back at the Park-Café who wants to dance should go to the PA, Munich's high-class discotheque. The experience might be even more impressive.

This disco operates on the envy *principle. The manager said: "If, for ex*ample, two friends turn up and we let one in and refuse admission to the other, what do you think that means to the one who is let in? He suddenly has power over the others."

He told a story. "A bunch of people were standing at the door in vain, and *then one turned up and went past them* all and went in. That was just great."

Almost everyone is turned away from another joint known called the PI, and there is often trouble, not from Munich people but from outsiders from Berlin or Hamburg who are not used to this sort of thing.

A manager said: "We have very many regular customers, who only get upset at new faces in the place. When someone turns up particularly well-dressed we then make an exception, of course."

He said that the regulars included Gloria von Thurn und Taxis, Uwe Ochsenknecht, Heiner Lauterbach and Mick Flick. *Obviously they enjoy the* appeal of being "behind the most closely guarded doors in Munich."

Stephan Lebert

(Nürnberger Nachrichten, 29 October 1988)

At a relic of the 50s, it's still red roses and ladies' choice

A dancehall on the notorious Reeper*bahn in Hamburg has been running* for 40 years.

This might not sound special. But although the Café Keese is in the red-light district, it is not of it.

It is a relic of the 1950s which has become an institution not so much as a dancehall but as a place where marri*ages are made.*

Single people, or at least the unattached, have been meeting here for dancing in a tasteful atmosphere, or with a lot more in mind, since it moved to the Reeperbahn in 1953.

In 1948, when it started up, it was one of about 300 dancehalls of compar*able size in Germany. Now there are* 12. Two of the rest are part of the same business and also called Café Keese. One is Berlin and the other at Niendorf, on the Baltic coast.

A commissionaire dressed in a gold-braided uniform, deals firmly with customers who dare to try and get into the *place wearing jeans and running shoes.*

Peter Feussner, a junior partner in the business, said: "We take that attitude as a gesture to customers who have dressed up for an evening out."

Walters wearing evening dress and patent-leather shoes, hurry along between the marble-topped tables which give the place the touch of a Viennese coffee house.

It all began in 1948 when Bernd-Wilhelm Keese, who died in April this year, discovered that there was money to be *made from the shortage of men in the* post-war period.

He set up a place which would help women find a partner. In the Café Keese the words "May I?" have always been said by a woman and it is the male who has the chance to refuse.

Feussner said: "Women like to dance and like to be able to do so without being chatted up. I also think it is a sign of *emancipation when the woman can take* the lead."

When a man can no longer bear being a wall-flower at his table he discreetly sends a red rose to the table of the lady of his choice who, according to Keese tradition, expresses her gratitude with a dance.

The bar is the neutral zone for those who do not want to shake a leg. The man can also refuse a dance if he wants to there.

One woman, accompanied by her girl-friend from work, said: "The men who sit at the bar like cocks on a perch are full of anxiety."

The two women were like so many woman; they just wanted to dance and see what was going on. She said: "Where else can we go to dance without a man?"

But Café Keese is not just famous for dancing. It is a place to meet someone else for a night or for a lifetime. Dancing helps people to get together.

Over the years *98,000* couples have met for the first time at one of the company's establishments. The owners are proud of the many letters of gratitude they have had from clients.

Walter Kim, 55, who has been with Café Keese for 25 years and is now almost one of the fittings, gets a letter every Christmas which includes $500.

He said: "The dollars are from a Mexican in gratitude. He got to know his wife here."

For anyone who gets a chance to have a look in the powder room, where the ladies put a final touch to their hair and make-up, *it is obvious that a little more* is expected than just a nice evening.

One customer got no fun from the whole business. He could not dance and had only accompanied a friend who did not dare to go alone.

Another did not like the business of the women inviting the men to dance. *He was frequently invited to dance.*

The women colleagues, on the other hand, had a great time. They looked for the best dancers and took a mischievous delight in the idea that they would tell their husbands that they had been celebrating a birthday with friends and had had a little drink.

There is no such person as a typical Café Keese customer. There are 25-year-olds in their non-crease disco togs and more conservative women in evening dress. Men in dark suits drink scotch next to guys in leather-jackets putting down beers.

Everyone has to pay DM20 for the first alcoholic drink. During the week between 300 and 500 people visit Café Keese; at the weekends as many as 1,000 crowd into the dance-hall.

Feussner said: "People come to us from all walks of life."

He puts the success of his dance-hall down to the anonymity of a large city. "We would certainly have problems in a small town," he said.

Julia Gierke

(Nordwest Zeitung, Oldenburg, 1 November 1988)